1		State OF HAWAII
2		LAND USE COMMISSION
3		Hearing held on May 24, 2017
4		Airport Conference Center
5		400 Rogers Blvd., Suite 700, Room #3
6		Honolulu, Hawaii 96813
7		Commencing at 9:00 a.m.
8		
9	AGENDA	
10	I.	Call to Order
11	II.	Adoption of Minutes
12	III.	Tentative Meeting Schedule
13	IV.	ACTION
14 15		SP09-403 Department of Environmental Services, City and County of Honolulu (Waimanalo Gulch Sanitary Landfill), (Oahu)
16	V.	Executive Session
17	VI.	Adjournment
18		
19		
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21	BEFORE: Jean Marie McManus, CSR #156	
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     APPEARANCES:
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      EDMUND ACZON, Chairman
      JONATHAN SCHEUER, Vice Chairman
3
      ARNOLD WONG, Vice Chairman
4
      COMMISSIONERS:
      GARY OKUDA
5
      LINDA ESTES
      DAWN N.S. CHANG
6
     NANCY CABRAL
7
      DIANE ERICKSON, ESQ.
      Deputy Attorney General
8
9
      STAFF:
10
      DAN ORODENKER, Executive Director
      RILEY K. HAKODA, Planner/Chief Clerk
11
     BERT K. SARUWATARI, Planner
12
      CALVIN CHIPCHASE, ESQ.
      CHRISTOPHER GOODIN, ESQ.
13
      For Ko Olina Community Association and
     Maile Shimabukuro
14
      RICHARD WURDEMAN, ESQ.
15
      For Colleen Hanabusa
16
      IAN SANDISON, ESQ.
      AVERY MONTRO, ESQ.
     For Schnitzer Steele Hawaii
17
18
      DANA VIOLA, ESQ.
      KATHLEEN KELLY, ESQ.
19
      Deputies Corporation Counsel
      For Department of Environmental Services
20
      City and County of Honolulu
2.1
      Bryan YEE, ESQ.
      RODNEY FUNAKOSHI, Planner
22
      Office of Planning
      State of Hawaii
23
      RAY YOUNG, planner
2.4
      Department of Planning and Permitting
      City and County of Honolulu
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CHAIRMAN ACZON: Good morning. This is the 1 2 May 24/25th, 2017 Land Use Commission meeting. 3 Chair notes for the record that there is a 4 typographical error in Agenda item II. The date of the minutes to be considered is actually April 26, 5 6 2017. 7 The first order of business is adoption of any corrections or comments on that. If not, is 8 9 there a motion to adopt? 10 COMMISSIONER CHANG: I move to adopt. 11 COMMISSIONER ESTES: Second the motion. 12 CHAIRMAN ACZON: A motion has been made by 13 Commissioner Chang and seconded by Commissioner 14 Estes. 15 All in favor say "aye". Opposed? 16 VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: Abstain. 17 CHAIRMAN ACZON: The minutes are adopted with one abstention. 18 Commissioner Chang, do you have any -- let 19 20 me go through the next agenda. The next agenda item 2.1 is the tentative meeting schedule. Mr. Orodenker. 22 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: Thank you, Mr. Chair, 23 On May 31st, we have a special meeting to 24 handle the Lana'i remand case. That will be on Maui. 25 June 14th was set aside for this Waimanalo

Gulch case, if needed. June 15th is vacant. 1 2 June 28th and 29th on Kaua'i Lima Ola 3 Petition. And on July 19 and 20th we will be on Maui 4 for Kau'ono'ulu FEIS acceptance. 5 July 26th, once again on Kaua'i for action 6 7 on the Lima Ola matter. August 9th and 10th, we have Oahu Solar 8 9 Special Permit that are scheduled. 10 August 23rd and 24th is scheduled, the Kau'ono'ulu Motion to Amend on Maui. 11 12 And September is open. 13 October 16, HCPO, which will be on Oahu. 14 CHAIRMAN ACZON: Thank you, Mr. Orodenker. Commissioners, any questions on our 15 16 schedule? Thank you. 17 The next agenda item meeting on Docket SP09-403 Department of Environmental Services, City 18 and County of Honolulu, Oahu (Civil No. 19 09-1-2719-11). 20 21 First, Intervenor Ko Olina Community 22 Association and Maile Shimabukuro's Motion to Deny 23 and Remand. 24 Second, Intervenor Ko Olina Community

Association and Maile Shimabukuro's Motion to Deny

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the Application unless certain conditions are 1 2 imposed. 3 Before we move on, I want to call on 4 Commissioner Chang. COMMISSIONER CHANG: I would like to make a 5 6 disclosure that a couple of years ago I was a 7 consultant for Waimanalo Gulch on a criminal matter. CHAIRMAN ACZON: Any objections from the 8 9 parties? 10 MR. CHIPCHASE: No objections. 11 MR. SANDISON: No objection. 12 MS. VIOLA: No objection. 13 MR. WURDEMAN: No. CHAIRMAN ACZON: We will first consider 14 15 Intervenor Ko Olina Community Association and Maile 16 Shimbukuro's Motion to Deny and Remand and take the 17 other items in order as necessary. 18 Will the parties please identify themselves 19 for the record? 20 MS. VIOLA: Good morning, Chair, Vice 21 Chair, Members of the Commission, Dana Viola and 22 Kathleen Kelly on behalf of the Department of 23 Environmental Services, City and County of Honolulu. 24 MR. CHIPCHASE: Cal Chipchase and Chris 25 Goodin on behalf of the Ko Olina Community

1 Association and Senator Maile.

Steel Hawaii.

MR. WURDEMAN: Good morning, Richard N.

3 Wurdeman on behalf of Intervenor Colleen Hanabusa.

MR. YEE: Deputy Attorney Bryan Yee on behalf of Office of Planning. With me is Rodney Funakoshi behind me from Office of Planning.

MR. SANDISON: Good morning, Ian Sandison and Avery Montro on behalf of Intervenor Schnitzer

CHAIRMAN ACZON: Good morning everyone.

Thank you. Let me update the record.

On May 18, 2016, the Commission met on this matter to receive a status report and take appropriate action if necessary.

On May 31, 2016, the Commission received the May 2016 mandated status report from the Department of Environmental Services.

On June 7, 2016, the Commission received a copy of correspondence to the Honolulu Planning

Commission from Deputy Corporation Counsel Kamilla

Chan re: Request for follow-up status report or extension on State Special Use Permit to Supersede

Existing Special Use Permit to allow a 92.5 acre expansion and time expansion for the Waimanalo

Sanitary Gulch Landfill.

On June 14, 2016, the Commission received a copy of correspondence to the Honolulu Planning

Commission from Deputy Attorney General Bryan Yee re:

Request for follow-up status report or extension on

State Special Use Permit to Supersede Existing

Special Use Permit to allow a 92.5 acre expansion and time expansion for the Waimanalo Sanitary Gulch

Landfill.

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On June 27, 2016, the LUC received correspondence from the City and County of Honolulu Deputy Corporation Counsel Kamilla Chan re: Copy of Department of Environmental Services' Motion to Stay Proceedings at the Planning Commission to April 22, 2017.

From July, 2016 - March 2017, the

Commission received mandated status reports from

Environmental Services.

On December 6, 2016, the Commission received copies of City and County of Honolulu Planning Commission correspondence regarding the Waimanalo Gulch Sanitary Landfill.

On May 1, 2017, the Commission Received Planning Commission of City and County of Honolulu, File No. 2008/SUP-2-Fingings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision and Order dated 5/1/2017.

On May 3, 2017, the Commission received the 1 2 Consolidated Record from DPP-Planning Commission, an 3 index of the record and original and copies of the 2008 proceedings. 4 5 On May 12, 2017, the Commissioner received: 6 Intervenors KOCA and Shimabukuro's Motion 7 to Deny and Remand and Exhibits A through D. Intervenors KOCA and Shimabukuro's 8 9 Alternate Motion to Deny the Application Unless 10 Additional Conditions are Imposed, Exhibits 1 through 11 5. On May 17, 2017, the Commission mailed the 12 13 May 24-25, 2017 agenda notice to the Parties, 14 statewide and Oahu mailing lists. 15 On May 19, 2017, the Commission received: 16 Department of Environmental Services, City 17 and County of Honolulu's response to Intervenors' 18 KOCA and Shimabukuro's Motion to Deny and Remand and 19 Exhibit 1. 20 Department of Environmental Services, City 21 and County of Honolulu's Memorandum in Opposition to 22 Intervenor's KOCA and Shimabukuro Alternate Motion to 23 Deny the Application unless additional conditions are 24 imposed, and Exhibits 1.

On May 22, 2017, the Commission received:

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Τ	OP's public testimony Statement	
2	Recommending approval of SP application.	
3	Intervenor Hanabusa's Joinder to	
4	Intervenors' KOCA and Shimabukuro's Motion to Deny	
5	and Remand.	
6	Department of Environmental Services	
7	Amended Certificates of Service to:	
8	Department of Environmental Services, City	
9	and County of Honolulu's Response to Intervenor	
10	KOCA's Motion to Deny and Remand.	
11	Department of Environmental Services, City	
12	and County of Honolulu's Memorandum in Opposition to	
13	Intervenor KOCA's Alternate Motion to Deny the	
14	Application unless additional conditions are imposed.	
15	On May 23, 2017, the Commission received:	
16	Correspondence from Intervenors KOCA and	
17	Shimabukuro regarding Request to Settle the Proposed	
18	Form of Order Granting in part Intervenor's Motion to	
19	Deny and Remand.	
20	Correspondence from Intervenor Schnitzer	
21	Steel-Statement of Position on Intervenors' Motion to	
22	Deny and Remand.	
23	Let me go over our procedures for this	
24	docket.	
25	First I will call for those individuals	

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desiring to provide public testimony for the

Commission's consideration to identify themselves.

All such individuals will be called in turn to our witness box where they will be sworn in prior to their testimony.

After completion of the public testimony

Movant Intervenor KOCA/Shimabukuro will make its

presentation on its motions.

After the completion of the Movant's presentation, the Department of Environmental Services will make their presentation on the motions.

After the completion of the Department of Environmental Services' presentation, Intervenor Hanabusa will make their presentation on the motions.

After the completion of Intervenor

Hanabusa's presentation, we will receive any argument
on the motions from Intervenor Schnitzer Steel.

After the completion of Intervenor

Schnitzer Steel's comments, we will receive any

argument from the Department of Environmental

Services, City ans County of Honolulu on the motions.

After the completion of Department of Environmental Services argument on the motions, we will receive public testimony from the State Office of Planning.

After we receive comments from the State
Office of Planning, the Commission will conduct its
deliberations.

After we receive public comments from the State Office of Planning, the Commission will conduct its deliberations.

I would also note for the parties and the public that from time to time I will be calling for short breaks.

Are there any questions as to our procedure for today?

MR. YEE: Excuse me, Chair. Bryan Yee for Office of Planning.

When you were going through the list, I think you were referring after Intervenor Schnitzer Steel that you were going to be receiving comments from the City and county.

This is I think where you typically would receive comments from the Department of Planning and Permitting of the City and County on any scheduled permit, rather than comment from one of the -- in this case, one of the Applicants for the Special Permit.

So I think, although you said you had received comments from Department of Environmental

Services, I think what you probably meant to say was 1 2 you would receive a comment from the City Department 3 of Planning and Permitting who I believe is not showing up today. 4 MR. YOUNG: I'm here. 5 MR. YEE: Oh, I'm sorry. So they may 6 7 provide comments, but I think that's where their comments would occur -- their comments would occur, 8 9 rather than Environmental Services. 10 CHAIRMAN ACZON: Okay, we will adjust the 11 procedure. Thank you, Mr. Yee. 12 Are there any members of the public wishing 13 to give testimony? 14 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: Thank you, Mr. Chair. No one has signed up to testify. 15 16 CHAIRMAN ACZON: Intervenor KOCA/Shimabukuro, would you like to reserve any time 17 18 rebuttal before you start your presentation? 19 MR. CHIPCHASE: Yes, Chair. 20 CHAIRMAN ACZON: Please proceed. 2.1 MR. CHIPCHASE: Commissioners, as was noted 22 in the agenda that the Chair read and you have before 23 you, Ko Olina filed two motions. First is the Motion to Deny and Remand; 24

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second is the Motion to Deny unless additional

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conditions are imposed.

I'll submit to you that there is no need to move past the first motion today, the Motion to Deny and Remand. That motion raised three procedural objections, if you will, to the process and participation of the Commission in reaching a decision on the Applications.

The procedural errors in that process warrant remand, and every party has acknowledged that to the Commission. So we can narrow the scope even further. We raise three issues in our motions, and need to talk about two of them.

The Commission, as the Chair noted, has received the complete record from the Planning Commission, received it on May 3rd, a complete record. Also the Planning Commission's recommended decision signed by the Commission and stamped and made part of the record.

Everything has come up to this body for decision. The problem is in reaching that decision, the Planning Commission erred. And it erred in material ways.

The first error relates to Planning

Commission Rule 2-75, which we put up on the screen.

That rule creates a special procedure when less than

all of the Commissioners are hearing the proceedings 1 2 on the hearing day. 3 VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: Procedurally, is this 4 an exhibit, this presentation? MR. CHIPCHASE: The presentation is not a 5 6 separate exhibit. 7 VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: How will it be included in the proceedings? 8 9 MR. CHIPCHASE: It's just as a visual aid. 10 Everything in the presentation is part of our filings, but the presentation itself is not a 11 12 separate exhibit. 13 VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: Thank you for 14 clarifying. 15 MR. CHIPCHASE: Happy to submit --16 CHAIRMAN ACZON: We can give you time for 17 your argument. Can you please do that? 18 MR. CHIPCHASE: Certainly. 19 CHAIRMAN ACZON: Please proceed with your 20 argument. MR. CHIPCHASE: So the Rule 2-75 creates 21 22 special procedure when fewer than all the 23 Commissioners participate. 24 COURT REPORTER: Slow down a little bit for 25 me, please.

1 MR. CHIPCHASE: You got it.

So if you have a situation where a Commissioner misses a hearing day, then this procedure applies. And what this procedure says is that before the Commission reaches a decision, it has to circulate the proposed order to all the parties, allow all the parties to submit exceptions to that proposed order, and then allow argument on that order before you can adopt it.

So in our case, which, as you know, has spanned a long time, none of the Commissioners participated in all of the hearing dates. None of them.

And so it's undisputed that this procedure applied to our case. It also is undisputed this procedure was not followed. No one challenges that.

So as a consequence of that failure, failure to follow procedure, the matter has to go back. The decision is defective, because it was reached in an unlawful procedure.

The second problem with the Commission, Planning Commission decision is that they didn't follow the Land Use Commission's direction.

In 2012 the Land Use Commission remanded the 2008 Application to the Planning Commission and

directed the Planning Commission to consolidate it with the later filed 2011 Application. And then after consolidation, issue a single set of Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order so that this body only had to consider one complete document.

The Planning Commission got it half right.

They consolidated the proceedings so that the 2008 and 2011 proceedings were consolidated and made one proceeding. But then when it issued its decision, it did not issue consolidated Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, Decision and order. It only addressed 2011 a draft was issued consolidated

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order. It only addressed 2011 oral -- deliberately so, if you look at the transcript. Why? I'm unclear. But deliberately so. That's not what the Planning Commission was directed to do.

So, again, the decision is defective. No party disputes any of that, that the decision was not uniform or unified, that it is defective, and that it needs to go back.

And so if you look at the parties'

position -- this is from ENV's response to our

motion -- ENV acknowledged that it would be entirely

appropriate to remand for compliance with 2-75 in issuing the final decision.

And if you look at Schnitzer's submission,
Schnitzer agrees that the decision is invalid and
that this Commission, the Land Use Commission, is not
in receipt of a valid legally effective decision.
All of that is true.

The question is not whether the decision is defective, or even what the outcome ultimately is.

It's remand and go back to the Planning Commission for further proceedings.

The only thing the parties dispute is what this body needs to say and do to get us back there in the appropriate way.

So our position, and the position joined by Intervenor Colleen Hanabusa, is that the appropriate vehicle is to grant the motion, our motion in part, which would be to deny the application without prejudice to refiling, to continue the proceedings, to coming back before this body, deny it without prejudice and order a remand for further proceedings.

We believe that that's the appropriate procedure, because this body is governed by two -- really one statutory provision, and one rule provision.

The statutory provision in 2-56(e), which we put on the screen, sets out this body's role in a Special Use Permit proceeding, what this body must do.

And so if you look down at the bottom of that section it directs the Land Use Commission that it shall act to do three things. Approve, approve with modification, or deny the petition. It has to do that with 45 days after receipt of the complete record.

Again, as the Chair read in the introduction, you have received a record. Within 45 days you shall do one of these three things.

"Shall" is always viewed as a mandatory term in statutory construction.

There are three enumerated acts. You have to do one of those three things within 45 days.

This statutory provision is mirrored in large part in the Planning Commission's rule on Special Permit. In 15-15-96(a), if we look at the first part of that rule, the substance of it tracts that statute, you shall act -- again, mandatory language -- within 45 days to do one of three things.

The only three things set out in that rule are the same three things set out in the statute:

Approve, approve with modification, or deny. That is the "shall act". That is the mandatory thing that you must do.

What the rule adds is the consequences of those actions, or rather an option as part of those actions.

At the bottom of the rule it provides that upon determination by the Commission, the petition may be remanded to the Planning Commission for further proceedings.

So we see a couple of things here. One, introduction to that power says "upon determination". The determination is the first part of that rule, and the statute, you shall act: Approve, approve with modification or deny.

The second thing we see in that rule is the discretionary term "may". You don't have to remand. You may remand for further proceedings. What you have to do is to act to deny -- approve, I'm sorry -- approve, approve with modifications, or deny. If you do that, then you may remand. That is the structure that's set up by the statute mirrored in the rule. That's the procedure that we believe is appropriate today.

The other parties, I would submit for

optical reasons, don't like the word "deny"; don't like that you would act to deny the application. And so they've come up with various creative reasons that you should follow a different procedure, different terminology to get it back to the Planning Commission.

One argument advanced by ENV is that what you really have is an incomplete record because the decision was made on an unlawful procedure, your record isn't complete. And so you can just remand to complete the record. That position ignores a couple of things.

The first is that you do have a complete record. The record is the papers or are the papers, the exhibits, the hearing transcripts, you have all of that. Right, you have a complete record. And if you didn't, the rule would provide that the Executive Director would poll the Planning Commission, and say we don't have a complete record, send a complete record up to us.

That's obviously not the situation here.

The record is complete. There is nothing else for the Planning Commission to send up to you. Instead what the Planning Commission has to do is redo its decision to do it right.

Schnitzer Steel doesn't dispute that the record is complete. Their view of it is that you don't have -- because your decision -- the decision the Planning Commission reached is legally defective, it's really like you don't have a decision. That position too is -- (coughing - inaudible).

One is the fact that you actually do have a decision. You have something in writing signed by all the Commissioners who participated in that -- (coughing - inaudible) -- and to made part of the record sent to you. That's why we are here, is that you actually have a decision.

The second thing is that a legally defective decision doesn't become -- (coughing - inaudible) it's not a nonentity. It requires some action on it to dispose of it. And how you dispose of it, again, is directed by statute: Approve, approve with modification, deny. If you do those three things, then you may remand. Do one of those three things, you may remand.

ENV's next argument is that the rule creates a fourth option, that remand is not controlled by doing one of those three things, approve, approve with modification or deny. It stands alone as a fourth option. You cannot do any

of those and still remand for further proceeding.

A couple problems with that view as well.

One is that it conflicts with the statute. The statute doesn't say: You shall approve, approve with modification, deny or remand. It says within 45 days you shall do one of these three things. The rule cannot enlarge your power. The mandatory action -- it cannot conflict with that mandatory action. The mandatory action is the three things. To add a fourth would conflict with the three expressed statutory direction, within 45 days you shall do one of these three things.

If you do a fourth thing, you haven't done one of the three things the statute told you to do within 45 days.

The second problem with the ENV construction is that it doesn't track the text of the rule. The text of the rule itself doesn't set that option up as a fourth part of the mandatory within 45 days you shall do. It sets up at the bottom, introduced by, upon determination, right? The determination can only be one of those three things. That's your statutory power. That's what the rule says.

Then it says you "may" do it. So it's not

even one of the mandatory acts, it's a discretionary act that follows from doing the approval, the approve with modification, or the denial.

The fourth argument advanced by both ENV and Schnitzer in different ways is that, well, okay, Ko Olina's reading may be literal to the statute and the rules, but it's absurd, because if you deny the Application, you immediately lose jurisdiction, or the idea that denial and remand do not co-exist.

The remand is simply part of the order.

It's one of the consequences. You could approve, approve with modification, or deny and not remand. You could do any of those three things and not remand, and it would simply be a final decision of this Commission. There would be no further agency proceedings on it; or you could do any of those things and remand. And then there absolutely are further agency proceedings on the Application.

You could, for example, approve an application in part, application in part. Approve an application in part, but require additional factual evidence to support a different part or with respect to a particular condition, and you could send it back down to the Planning Commission.

You can do the same thing with

modification. You approve an order modifying that would require further actual development.

Or as in our case, you could deny

Application because the Application was made on an
unlawful procedure which nobody disputes. What then
do you do with it? You can't approve this

Application. It was made on unlawful procedures.

You can't modify it, because you can't fix the
procedure. All you can do is deny it.

And then when you deny it, what's the consequence? Is that the end? Is the Application dead? No. We all agree it's not dead. You send it back down for further proceedings.

And this concept of reversal or the vacatur of the decision and a remand is not unique. We put up on the screen the rule from Hawaii Appellate procedure, Rule 35, sets up those two distinctions.

If the court on appeal of a circuit court decision or a trial court decision reverses the court, that's the end of the proceeding, because you said it's denied, done. The decision is over. We have changed it. Or you can vacate. The court can vacate and remand. We have undone the decision. It's gone. We've eliminated it.

But that's not the end of the proceeding.

We have remanded for further proceedings, for whatever reason. We had it in this case when the court vacated the 2009 order and remanded. The court didn't reverse, it vacated and remanded and sent it back here, and you sent it back down to the Planning Commission.

That's the right result here using your rules in just slightly different language. You don't have a vacatur option, you have a denial option.

Then you have the discretionary power to remand.

That we submit is the procedure that should be followed today. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN ACZON: Thank you.

 $$\operatorname{Ms.}$ Viola, please proceed with ENV's argument.

MS. VIOLA: The City wants to clarify its position. The City is arguing that we are not objecting to remand to the limited purpose of allowing the Planning Commission to complete the record.

COURT REPORTER: I'm not hearing you well. Please speak into the microphone, if you can.

MS. VIOLA: Again, we want to clarify that our position is that the City is not objecting to remanding for the limited purpose, allowing the

Planning Commission to complete the record by demonstrating compliance with Planning Commission Rule 2-75, and that LUC's directive to provide a single Decision and Order for both the 2008 and 2011 application.

The City believes that this is the accurate interpretation of the law. Mr. Chipchase is arguing that the statute and the rule require that there are decisions to be made, but the Statute 205-16 does not provide for remand, does not articulate specifically the right to remand.

The remand provision is articulated in the Land Use Commission Rule 15-15-96(a). If you read those two laws together, the only reasonable interpretation to allow for remand is on the condition that the record was not complete.

Because once the Land Use Commission makes a decision on the merits of the case to approve, approve upon modification, or deny, that is the Land Use Commission's decision on the substantive argument before the -- that's part of the -- it's the substantive conclusion and final decision on the Application.

A remand would allow for the Planning Commission to further -- to conduct further

proceedings on the Application itself. There is a difference between the Land Use Commission considering the substance of the decision and the substance of the Application, and therefore, making the final decision, and the Land Use Commission remanding for a procedural matter to allow the Planning Commission to conduct further proceedings on the Application to present to the Land Use Commission to rule on the substance of these Applications.

If the Land Use Commission -- excuse me.

Mr. Chipchase is arguing that the remand is only part and parcel of the decision on the Application, and that doesn't really make sense, doesn't make legal sense. Because if you decide on the Application itself, that's your decision relating to the parties. It doesn't require further action by the Planning Commission.

He gave examples of approving in part, but if the Planning Commission is not going to make a final decision on the merits of the case, they wouldn't bifurcate the case and separate part for final decision-making and part for continuing procedural actions by the Planning Commission. They would make a final decision either to approve, approve with modifications or deny.

And that final decision is recognized by or further reinforced by the fact that the statute as well as the rules provides that the decision by the Planning Commission is appealable to the circuit court. So it's a final action that is appealable to a higher court.

And the Planning Commission -- if the Planning Commission were to take further action, that would be without a final decision by the Land Use Commission.

Mr. Chipchase argues that this is a creative way of explaining how to do deal with this without getting the negative declaration or determination by the Land Use Commission on the Applicant's SUP. And it's not a creative way of explaining, it's the reasonable way of explaining, and it would justify the Land Use Commission's prior acts of remanding matters, other matters for which the Land Use Commission remanded without making the decision on the Application.

For example, in the Petition, the Glover
Petition, which is Docket No. SP14-404, the Fong
Construction Petition Docket No. SP94-387, and the
County of Kauai Department of Public Works Petition
Docket No. SP95-388, the Land Use Commission did take

action to remand the matter for further proceedings before the Planning Commission, and did not make a final decision on the Application itself.

So the only way to justify, to explain that process and to make it -- and to explain the correct proceedings is to state that the Land Use Commission in those previous proceedings, as well as this proceeding, made the determination that the record was incomplete and therefore justified remand for further procedural matters.

If, as Mr. Chipchase argues, that the Land Use Commission was required to make a decision on the application in those prior proceedings, that means that in those prior proceedings, the subsequent decision by the Land Use Commission to consider the amended Decision and Order from the Planning Commission would be nullified, and the automatic approval, and the 24 conditions, and five-year deadline on the Special Use Permit would be applicable to all those previous matters because there was no denial of the petition.

So for those reasons, the City would argue that the only reasonable interpretation of the statute, as well as the administrative rule, is that it is reasonable for the Land Use Commission to

remand the matter on the grounds that an incomplete record has not been provided by the Planning Commission, and to allow the Planning Commission to complete that record by demonstrating compliance with the procedural rules and with the recommendation of the LUC for a single Decision and Order.

CHAIRMAN ACZON: Thank you, Ms. Viola.

Mr. Wurdeman, please proceed with your argument.

MR. WURDEMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, members of the Commission.

Just briefly, I certainly agree with Mr. Chipchase's arguments and his construction of both the statute and the administrative rules, HAR 15-15-96(a) and what should be done by this Commission.

Of course, this is done without waiving our earlier objections back in 2012 that the Commission should have never remanded the record to begin with. But without waiving that objection, we agree that Mr. Chipchase's articulation of the statute and the rule is the correct one.

It is clearly mandatory. There's a complete record that was sent to the Commission, unlike the case that I'm unfamiliar with that ENV

just tried to articulate as an exception.

But one other point I think is important to note, that unless -- and this is more of a practical consideration, based on the five years of inactivity of the Planning Commission and not following what the Land Use Commission initially ordered it to do in a timely fashion.

If we just simply remand, we may be stuck again in another five-year quagmire of the Planning Commission not doing what they're supposed to do and not vacating the legal order that they entered, and then we would be faced with that dilemma.

And I think that that practical matter is certainly a real one given the history of this case.

And, again, with respect to the rule and the statute, I think that denial without prejudice in the remand is the proper course to take in this matter. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN ACZON: Thank you. Mr. Sandison, please proceed.

MR. SANDISON: Schnitzer joins in and supports the City's argument and believes that this Commission should not consider the substance of the Planning Commission's decision, and that a denial would be a final decision under the Hawaii

Administrative Procedures Act, and that denial would then be ripe for appeal, I believe in this case, to the Supreme Court; and that the appropriate remedy is for the Land Use Commission to remand to the Planning Commission in order to allow the Planning Commission to fix the obvious procedural defects with its current decision; and that to substantively rule with a denial would compound the existing procedural errors. A denial without prejudice would be ineffective, and there is --

Mr. Chipchase, in his letter of yesterday, suggests a remedy of the timing issues would be to waive 15-96(e). We believe that that is inappropriate, and that the appropriate thing for the Land Use Commission to do is to simply remand the instruction to remedy the procedural defects.

That is the cleanest solution. It will end up with a clean Decision and Order coming back up.

Any kind of final action today will further complicate this procedure. And it by far and away the best thing to do is to send it back down without taking final action, and making a decision which a denial would be, and allowing the Planning Commission to fix the issues, and then send back a clean record for the Commission to take on the substantive issues.

1 Thank you.

2 CHAIRMAN ACZON: Thank you, Mr. Sandison.

Mr. Chipchase, your rebuttal.

MR. CHIPCHASE: If it is all right, I would like to speak after OP has given its comments.

6 CHAIRMAN ACZON: That's fine, Mr. Yee. You
7 want to offer a witness?

MR. YEE: You want to ask for Department of Planning and Permitting to see if they have any --

CHAIRMAN ACZON: I will -- I was going to call them next.

MR. YEE: When you went through the list, you mentioned them first.

Sure. First of all, this is a highly technical legal issue before you. Everyone seems to be in agreement on what should be done. The matter should be sent back to the Planning Commission.

They're to go through a process in which a proposed order is submitted to the parties. The parties have a chance to give their objection, file briefs, make an argument.

And the Planning Commission needs to come out with a decision which considers all their arguments as well as provides a unified decision for the entire consolidated case. Everyone agrees.

The argument seems to be over whether the method that is sent back -- by which this case is sent back to them, is through a denial and remand or simply a remand. That's the dispute.

And if you're like my client, a lot of you are just wondering why are we arguing about this.

Who cares? Right? So I don't care how it gets back to them. It doesn't matter what you call it as long as it gets back to them.

So let me focus on why I think the issue might be important. And I think that defines, perhaps, at least for us, the Office of Planning, what the issues are.

And the question really is, if you deny and remand, would that create a jurisdictional problem in looking at this again when it comes back to you.

And there are two jurisdictional arguments.

One is, if you issue a denial, is that case then

immediately appealable to the circuit court, and

which would then divest anyone of jurisdiction.

That's probably not the bigger
jurisdictional question for the Office of Planning,
because we cannot imagine anyone appealing the remand
where everyone seems to be in agreement that that's
what should be done.

So where everyone is in agreement, there is no basis for an appeal. It doesn't make any sense to us that an appeal would be sought.

Technically it could happen, for example, if you could remand it in order -- if you found there was a violation of 25-7 and remanded it, and one of the parties disagrees that there was a violation, perhaps an appeal could have been had from that, but no one disagrees about it. Everyone agrees it should be remanded for the reasons set forth by the parties.

So for the Office of Planning, that's not probably not our bigger jurisdictional concern.

The bigger concern deals with your rule, and in 15-15-95(b) it says that once you deny a Special Permit, the LUC won't look at that Special Permit -- that Special Permit again for one year unless there are particularly good reasons to look at it again. And even then you're not going to look at it for six months. So under that rule it says a minimum of six months has to pass before you look at a Special Permit that's been denied.

Now, that's clearly not intended to apply to this particular case where the LUC is not looking to substance of the Special Permit, but only the process that was followed by the Planning Commission.

So clearly everyone thinks you should be able to look at this permit again after it comes back from the Planning Commission less than six months from today.

KOCA argues that what you should do then is waive this rule pursuant to, I think it's 34, Rule 34, 15-15-34 in which you're allowed to waive procedural requirements.

The City is concerned, I think, that this might be a jurisdictional requirement, and you cannot waive jurisdictional requirement.

So if this provision that says you don't look at the Special Permit six months from now, at a minimum six months from now, is jurisdictional, then even if everyone agreed and stipulates, then no matter what, you can't look at it again.

And even if they said I'm waiving my right to argue it, they can still argue it again anyway.

In fact, not only can they do that, they not only have to argue in front of you, they can wait until it goes up on appeal to circuit court and argue it there. That's the concern.

The Office of Planning doesn't actually think it's jurisdictional. We think it can be waived. We would ask that each of the parties

explicitly state whether they are agreeable to waiving it. We can glean that perhaps from Intervenor KOCA and Shimabukuro because it was part of their proposed order form, but we haven't specifically heard from Intervenor Hanabusa or Schnitzer Steel or actually either ENV.

But putting that to one side, the question becomes, well, what's the risk? What's -- I mean that's the other question for you. It's okay, you know, maybe we don't think there is a jurisdictional problem, but what if there is? And what's the upside/downside to going either way?

So in other words, if you remand without denial, what's the downside? What's the likelihood that, if we deny and remand, that someone will successfully argue the jurisdictional question before the circuit court?

That's a very discretionary call for you.

It's not something the Office of Planning is going to give you a recommendation on specifically. All we will say is that our best understanding is that that particular rule is not jurisdictional, it can be waived, but we've been wrong before.

So it doesn't matter -- I mean, it's important to look at the rule and to make what you

think is the right decision. I understand the various arguments that the parties have made. We're happy to answer any questions about them, but otherwise we think they've been argued by each of them well.

The optics are irrelevant to us about what the optics are. So for us, the only issue is that last question. And with that, we will be happy to answer any questions.

CHAIRMAN ACZON: Thank you, Mr. Yee.

Call on DPP for public witness comment.

State your name and address for the record.

MR. YOUNG: Raymond Young. My address is

650 South King Street, 7th Floor.

CHAIRMAN ACZON: Please proceed.

MR. YOUNG: I'm the staff planner that was assigned to this project beginning in 2008, I think.

The Department does not have any change in their position on this, so officially our position still stands as the record shows.

I would like to add that historically the Land Use Commission had a similar case with Sphere LLC, I think that was back in 2010, where the Planning Commission sent up the Special Use Permit, which was subsequently remanded by the Commission to

the Planning Commission for further proceedings.

The Planning Commission went ahead, as instructed by the Land Use Commission, took further proceedings on it, and sent the record back to the Land Use Commission for final decision. Whereupon, the Intervenor in that case argued that the remand was actually a denial.

And the Land Use Commission went with that argument, and therefore, concluded that they had no jurisdiction.

So I just wanted to point that out to you.

CHAIRMAN ACZON: Thank you.

Mr. Chipchase, rebuttal?

MR. CHIPCHASE: Thank you, Chair.

I heard something that I've never heard before today, that's a lawyer admitting he might be wrong. I've certainly never done that.

You know, I think OP's comments with respect to why it matters are important. And I would like to layer in a third statute, or a third reason that it matters, and that is the deemed approval statute, 91-13-5.

This body, like all other bodies, must act within a statutory period. The action that this body must take is directed by 205-6. So if you don't take

an action that is directed by 205-6 within your statutory period, there is a risk of deemed approval. That is why it matters to us, and why I think it should matter to all the parties in this proceeding, because no one wants that result.

Unlike what we agree with OP is a procedural rule of this Commission with respect to considering petitions for Special Use Permits that have been denied, you can't waive the application of a statute. This body can waive the application of any procedural rule governing rehearing or taking back up a Special Use Permit. And we concur that waiver is appropriate in this case because the errors below are procedural in nature, but you cannot waive the application of the statute. And that is a real issue here, and why the form of this body's decision matters.

The things that the Planning Commission needs to do are not accurately described as completing the record or demonstrating compliance with the rule or this Commission's order. It's not as if the Planning Commission forgot to include three or five findings that it had actually made, or someone didn't sign it. The decision itself on its face is not defective.

The procedure followed to get there was defective. That procedure renders the decision not incomplete, not nonexistent, but invalid. And when you're faced with an invalid decision, you deny the application. The consequence is either finality, it's over, there's no remand, or remand for further proceedings.

That's what we propose here, deny it
because the decision was invalid, because it was
reached on unlawful procedure. Remand it for further
proceedings, not merely to complete the record. It's
not some folder that's missing somewhere that wasn't
included. They have to have further proceedings.
They're going to have to adopt a draft decision.
That draft decision is going to have to be complete.

We are going to move to recuse Chair Hazama for the comments that he made on the record, and in a practice we believe demonstrates pre-judgment before parties even submitted proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order.

The Commission will have to act on that motion. And when it reaches a decision, it will have to publish that decision to everyone. We will have to submit exceptions to it. And there will have to be a whole other hearing on the application or on

that order before they can reach a decision. These are not small things. This is not a cleanup. This is a redo of the way they reached the decision. And in addition, we will move to recuse Chair Hazama.

Those are substantive proceedings. And substantive proceedings require you to take some action on the Petition now, to approve with modification, or as we submit, denial and to remand.

I'm not familiar with the other SUP
petitions that were offered by ENV or by the City,
Department of Planning and Permitting, so I can't
really comment on whether they were exactly like this
where the problem wasn't some technical issue with
the decision, wasn't an incomplete record, but was
actually a substantive procedural flaw in the way
that they reached the decision. So I can't speak to
that.

I will note on the Sphere LLC petition that the City explained, that would be consistent with the Land Use Commission's decision, if it was accurately reported here, would be consistent with our view is that you had to take some action before you could remand. And so the remand would effectively be denial.

We would submit, and I'll go on the record,

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that the waiver of the procedural rule precluding the hearing of that application within six months is appropriate here.

I'll let Intervenor Hanabusa speak to whether she agrees with that.

2.1

So in the miracle of modern technology, we're able to pull up one of the petitions, one of the orders while the proceeding is ongoing. The Sphere Petition, which is reported to me here that you did actually deny and remand. That that was the procedure you followed in the Sphere. I don't know the substance of it, so I can't again speak to whether it's on fours with us, but it's one of the examples that was offered, and I was able to confirm online that it was a denial and a remand. That we think is the right result here.

I have nothing further. Happy to take any questions.

CHAIRMAN ACZON: Before you folks take questions from the Commissioners, I want to take a five-minute recess.

(Recess taken.)

HEARINGS OFFICER AMANO: Back on record.

Commissioners, any questions for the parties?

MS. VIOLA: May we have the opportunity to

respond to some of the Commission --

2.1

CHAIRPERSON ACZON: Go ahead.

MS. VIOLA: In terms of through the miracle of modern technology able to pull up Sphere,
S-p-h-e-r-e, case. If in fact it was remanded and then subsequently denial, then that would be consistent with my argument. That once the denial has occurred, once Land Use Commission has made its denial, that that's the final decision in the case.

They weren't allowed to remand it for further proceedings before the Planning Commission.

In the Glover case, in SP14-404, that the Land Use Commission has already considered, the remand was without an action on the application, and to consider additional evidence or additional testimony that the parties agreed to.

So in that case there was no denial and the Land Use Commission was able to remand for further proceedings before the Planning Commission, and then to reconsider the subsequently amended Planning Commission Decision and Order.

So in both those situations what the Planning Commission did is consistent with the City's argument that it was a procedural aspect. It didn't demand action on the application.

And if in fact -- I don't have the specifics of the Sphere case, but if in fact, as Mr. Chipchase has indicated, it was denial and remand and subsequently, as Mr. Young indicates, that it was determined that it was a denial period, then that's again consistent with our analysis, that once the Land Use Commission has made a final decision, that is final decision by Land Use Commission, cannot be further amended by the Planning Commission proceedings.

I want to also comment on Mr. Yee's point that if it is appealable, the decision is appealable, as it is pursuant the Statute 205-6 as well as 15-15-96, that if it i+s appealable, that would basically make it a final decision.

It wouldn't be a final decision just because of the likelihood of a party actually appealing it. The fact of it being appealable, as provided by statute and the rule, would characterize the decision as final, not whether the likelihood of whether or not the parties would appeal it or not.

And I also -- in terms of evaluating the risk, if the risk in this scenario that the City's arguing is that the parties would argue whether or not the record is complete or not, it wouldn't have

the detrimental affect of resulting in an automatic approval as argued by Mr. Chipchase, because that has not happened in the past with Land Use Commission's previous remand without taking action on the application.

The alternative risk is that if the Land
Use Commission does deny and the remand -- and the
remand is later determined to be -- not be available,
or not be an option because of the final denial, then
that would divest the Land Use Commission of the
jurisdiction, and there would be a final decision on
the application without considering the merits on the
application, and would essentially prejudice the
City, because their substantive argument was never
considered by the Land Use Commission.

So I think the risk is far greater for denial then with a determination on a procedural basis which is determining that the record is incomplete and would require further proceedings by the Planning Commission. That's all.

CHAIRPERSON ACZON: Thank you.

Commissioner Wong.

2.1

VICE CHAIR WONG: Question for the City, also Department of Planning and Permitting.

So the first part is ENV has no problem if

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this case going back to the City?
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                MS. VIOLA: Going back to the Planning
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     Commission?
                VICE CHAIR WONG: The Planning Commission,
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     yes.
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                MS. VIOLA: The City does not object to the
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     matter going back to the Planning Commission.
                VICE CHAIR WONG: So what I'm concerned
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     with is Department of Planning -- Planning Commission
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     had this case and sent it to Land Use Commission,
     correct?
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               MS. VIOLA: Yes.
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                VICE CHAIR WONG: In any way was ENV
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      reviewing this case at same time, or was watching
     this case?
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               MS. VIOLA: I'm not sure what you mean.
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                VICE CHAIR WONG: Let me just say.
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                What happened is during the Planning
     Commission hearing, was ENV ever a part of the
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20
     proceeding or even sitting back as an observer?
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                MS. VIOLA: No, the department is -- the
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     City is the Petitioner in the case, so we're actively
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      involved at the Planning Commission level and
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     throughout the case.
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               VICE CHAIR WONG: So the question -- couple
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1 questions.

2.1

First is: Did you believe, ENV, that the procedures was incomplete at that time?

MS. VIOLA: Well, the fact of the incomplete nature, the failure to follow, or 2-75 of the Planning Commission, that wasn't apparent to the parties until the Planning Commission finalized their order and sent it to the Land Use Commission.

At the point when they issued the order, the parties didn't have a chance to argue before the Planning Commission. So this argument had to come before you, because the Planning Commission sent the matter up to the Land Use Commission to consider.

So they did not say: Here's our order, do you have any additional comments? They didn't essentially comply with 2-75.

So at no point at the Planning Commission level was the City able to express any concerns regarding compliance of the rules.

VICE CHAIR WONG: So then what happened is there was a motion that was filed -- the Planning Commission sent -- whatever their item -- to the Land Use, then we got a motion to deny and remand?

MS. VIOLA: Yes.

VICE CHAIR WONG: Correct. And that was

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several days, weeks ago; is that correct? 1 2 MS. VIOLA: Yes. 3 VICE CHAIR WONG: Couldn't the City, before having this hearing, pull back this stuff before so 4 5 we don't even need to have this hearing? 6 MS. VIOLA: No. 7 VICE CHAIR: Why not? MS. VIOLA: The City doesn't have the 8 9 ability to control the process. It's dictated by 10 statute and rule, that once the Planning Commission 11 makes a decision, that it has to be placed before the Land Use Commission. We don't have control over the 12 13 matter at that point. 14 VICE CHAIR WONG: So they couldn't just say 15 we want it back to clean it up? 16 MS. VIOLA: No, we couldn't do that, unless 17 we withdrew our application, which would have 18 consequences. If we voluntarily withdraw, we can't 19 apply back for, I think, it's at least two -- a year. 20 So there is consequences for us to taking action to 21 essentially pull back the Application. 22 VICE CHAIR WONG: I'm going to

hypothetical.

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If we deny, remand, just send it back to the City, whatever way it's done, how long would that

take?

2.1

MS. VIOLA: It would depend on when the Planning Commission would schedule the proceeding. But, again, it's dictated by 2-75. So if the Land Use Commission is remanding for the sole purpose of complying with 2-75, that doesn't mean that the parties can reopen the case and provide further evidence, and this would go on for an extended period of time.

It just means that the Planning Commission would present their Decision and Order, their proposed Decision and Order to the parties, give the parties an opportunity to comment, and then argue orally their arguments on the exception.

So it's the procedural aspect, it's not a substantive rehearing of the matter.

VICE CHAIR WONG: But from what I heard from Chipchase, they're going to request that, I guess, Mr. Hazama is pulled away. I mean, asked to be recused or something because of his statements.

MS. VIOLA: Right. That's part of the procedural action. So this matter -- that's why we would clarify that again, that the City is not objecting to the remand for the limited purpose of complying with this rule and providing a single

1 | consolidated opinion on the Application.

So it's not -- we're not -- the remand is not for the purpose of reopening the case.

VICE CHAIR WONG: So I guess the Planning
Commission will go back, just let's say next week,
this week, back to Planning Commission -- I'm being
layman here. Then the Planning Commission has to
receive it, then has to put it on file like how we
have to -- on public -- tell public we are having
this hearing. So that could be another two, three -MS. VIOLA: I can't really say.

VICE CHAIR WONG: Like we have big docket, so it could be three months, could be four months, we don't know.

MS. VIOLA: Could be one month.

VICE CHAIR WONG: So I'm just saying that it's kind of -- I can't figure, you know -- it could be a year, I mean. So, I mean, just the timing of it. And just -- it just boggles my mind this issue that they couldn't just say we pull it back, clean it up and a give it back to you guys. You know, my son says, hey, clean this up and just give it back to me.

MS. VIOLA: Right. But Unfortunately the law requires that you go through certain process, which the City wouldn't have control over.

So I understand that it seems like it would 1 2 be a simple matter to have them pull it back 3 willingly, but since it's no longer with the Planning Commission, it's with the Land Use Commission, it's 4 5 unfortunately, in your eyes, your responsibility to 6 dictate the procedure at this point. 7 VICE CHAIR WONG: Thank you. 8 CHAIRPERSON ACZON: Anybody else, 9 Commissioners? 10 COMMISSIONER CHANG: I guess this question 11 is directed to probably all of the parties. I'm wondering if this is more than just 12 13 procedural. If the proposed order is circulated to 14 all of the parties, could the parties -- could any 15 changes to the proposed order substantively change the orders? 16 17 MR. CHIPCHASE: Of course. CHAIRPERSON ACZON: Vice Chair Scheuer. 18 19 VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: As with Commissioner 20 Chang, my questions are probably directed to all the 21 parties. I'll first direct them to Mr. Chipchase. 22 If we follow the City's recommendation of 23 merely remanding for the parties to have a chance to

comment on the proposed Decision and Order, how does

that affect, or how would it address the error of not

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consolidating the two, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision and Order documents?

MR. CHIPCHASE: It be wouldn't.

And so what needs to happen is the Planning Commission needs to come out with a new proposed decision, actually adopt a new proposed decision.

Commissioner Chang's point will even in proposal, substantively change, because it needs to address the 2008 application. It's a whole new decision.

It's not send it back, hey, this is our decision proposed now, please comment. It's a complete readoption of a proposed decision and comments.

And we will absolutely argue in our objections if the outcome such as a lack of a closure condition so there's no time cap on the landfill, we will absolutely argue to the Planning Commission that that's wrong. And in oral argument present additional testimony why that is wrong. And we would expect the Planning Commission to reach a different outcome.

VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: I will -- let me follow up one related question first for Mr. Chipchase.

How could that inclusion of the 2008

proceedings without -- with merely just proposing an additional order not include actual procedural errors into the process without actually reopening more full procedures in the case? How would just consolidating them and issuing a new proposed consolidated Decision and Order not, for instance, harm your client by not having them a chance to take up some of those issues that are in the 2008 as opposed to 2011 proceedings?

Was my question clear?

MR. CHIPCHASE: I hope so. I hope my answer is as clear as your question.

The parties, upon remand, each moved to reopen evidence before the Planning Commission for exactly that reason. We believe additional evidence would be appropriate to take in the proceedings.

Those motions were denied. So those are separate procedural problems that we may or may not ultimately appeal. But in terms of closure of evidence, the Planning Commission determined for its part that it is done hearing evidence.

What we would expect with respect to the 2008 Application is that that entire record that was developed as part of that is now part of the consolidated proceeding, and indeed in our own proposed findings we relied on it and designed it a

number of ways.

We would expect the Planning Commission, at a minimum, would hold a new hearing on the proposed decision before it adopts a proposed decision and then circulates it to the parties. That proposed decision will need to incorporate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law from the 2008 Application.

We will then make our positions on that in writing, and if we believe that it is appropriate to reopen the hearings for any reasons related to those findings, we would make those motions as well.

VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: Ms. Viola.

MS. VIOLA: In response to Commissioner
Wong and Commissioner Chang, as well as your
question, I think that it's procedural in the fact -based on the fact that it's going to be remanded for
the limited purpose of compliance with the rule.

So whereas Mr. Chipchase said he will provide additional testimony, I think the proper terminology is additional argument based on the newly proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and D and O from the Planning Commission.

And I agree with Mr. Chipchase's characterization that the evidentiary portion of the proceeding was closed by the Planning Commission. So

this remand, based on the limited purpose of complying with the procedural rule would be, again, limited to the Planning Commission providing -- producing a new D and O that would consolidate both cases.

And, yes, Commissioner Chang, that could bring up -- the Planning Commission could, upon additional consideration, or this remand consideration, they could change certain aspects of the findings and conclusions, that is a possibility.

But the purpose of the remand would be, again, to comply with the procedural rule. And the underlying proceeding, evidence in the underlying proceeding, evidence has been closed.

So, again, the purpose would be to provide amended decision that would consolidate both, allow the parties additional argument, not witness testimony, on the proposed order, then to get additional oral argument to express, emphasize their arguments.

COMMISSIONER CHANG: Can I ask a follow up?

Counsel, does the Commission, Planning

Commission have the discretion, if the matter comes

back to them, to reopen?

MR. CHIPCHASE: Yes, Commissioner, they

would, because the remand would be a remand to the Planning Commission. It wouldn't be a remand for window dressing. The Planning Commission could and must hold such further proceedings as are appropriate. Part of that is going to be compliance with 2-75. Part of that is certainly going to be consolidated findings. Part of that is certainly going to be our Motion to Recuse Chair Hazama, but there shouldn't be any limitation on what the Planning Commission can do in reaching not only the right procedural -- following the right process, but reaching the right decision.

MS. VIOLA: But the grounds for the remand that have been agreed upon, that Mr. Chipchase has represented for all parties is agreed upon is for, again, the limited purpose of complying with the procedural rule, and to consolidate -- to produce consolidated order for both 2008 and 2011 proceedings on our application.

So it is not to reopen the case, that is not the intent of the remand. So it would -- based on the motions that have already been filed, the remand would be for the limited purpose of complying with the rule. The remand would not be for the purpose of reopening the case in front of the

Planning Commission. And that would be up to Land Use Commission to rule on the motions in this case, which is to remand for a limited purpose.

2.1

COMMISSIONER CHANG: Would the remand -- if it is to be one consolidation as well as permitting all the parties an opportunity to comment, is the record complete? Is the record complete if there has not been an opportunity for all the parties to review the proposed findings, as well as the consolidation, and there may be an opportunity to substantively change the provision, is the record complete?

MS. VIOLA: I think the record would be complete if the Planning Commission can demonstrate compliance with the rules. So the rule in this particular case, in this particular matter is compliance with the procedural Rule 2-75, and the directive from the Land Use Commission to provide a consolidated order.

So I think that the record would be complete upon that showing of the Planning Commission.

COMMISSIONER CHANG: I guess my question is, is the record complete now? If, given that there are these proposed -- they have not had an opportunity to review the proposed findings, there's

also the consolidation, is the record complete now?

MS. VIOLA: I would argue that the record is not complete.

CHAIRPERSON ACZON: OP did you want to add something?

MR. YEE: Just to that question.

Upon remand, the Office of Planning's view that the Planning Commission would be required to do those two items, namely to comply with that particular rule and issue a consolidated decision.

Whether the evidentiary hearing is held, whether there are any other matters that the Planning Commission chooses to take up, we believe should be left to discretion of the Planning Commission.

So the parties may think it's completed or not, if that would be an issue, the Planning Commission can take that up. We don't believe the remand should make that determination at this point, and that discretion should be left with them.

We would also note that this would include, for example, if another -- I believe Mr. Chipchase is arguing that he might renew a call to recuse Chair Hazama. Even if he didn't, for example, Chair Hazama might decide in light of the filings today that he could issue a written decision explaining the reasons

for his decision, even if there is not a new motion, simply because he wants to supplement the record and state his reasons for doing so.

2.1

Quite frankly, given the newness of the Mauna Kea case and the frank differences between judicial and executive decision-making processes, namely, for example, in a judicial case if a judge gets recused, you just substitute a new judge.

In an administrative proceeding, if a member recuses himself, that voice will be lost and the decision would be made without that member.

So, you know, we simply say that it would be left to the discretion of the Planning Commission as to what other matters or the method by which these matters are done.

MR. CHIPCHASE: For Ko Olina and Senator Shimabukuro, we agree with that view. The failure to comply with the rule and the failure to issue a single consolidated decision are the reasons that the decision you have before you is defective. The remand is an actual remand.

The Planning Commission has to do those things. But this body shouldn't foreclose the Planning Commission from doing other things that might be appropriate in light of those actions.

CHAIRPERSON ACZON: Mr. Sandison, do you have anything to say?

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MR. SANDISON: The remand, I believe, is simple and the motion to recuse does not greatly complicate this case. The planning decision already has a proposed Decision and Order. They can circulate that.

The parties have all submitted their recommended Findings of Fact, Decision and Order.

And simply complying with Rule 2-75 of the Planning Commission, which Planning Commission can circulate for comment, if proposed Decision and Order, undoubtedly, the issues that have been raised here today would be raised in the exceptions to that.

The Parties and the Intervenors would be free to make whatever motions they wanted, recusal, up to the Planning Commission's discretion, and then the parties have the opportunity for oral argument before the Planning Commission, and they would come out with a complete record, and it included -- that resolves all of these issues.

It's not particularly complicated. It can happen fairly quickly.

 $\mbox{ \begin{tabular}{ll} VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: I have a question for \\ \mbox{Mr. Chipchase.} \end{tabular}$

I'm looking at one of the documents in our record, filing from July 19, 2012, from you on behalf your clients I believe in support of remand with instructions. And at that point in 2012, five years ago, one of the statements you made was that the landfill continues to harm the community and the community continues to oppose the landfill.

It's part of the record. Do you continue -- your clients continue to assert that the landfill is harming the community, the community opposes?

MR. CHIPCHASE: Yes.

VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: I guess what is disturbing to me is that these procedural errors drag on, it moves -- if your assertion in that brief is correct, the harm to this community continues to go on the more times it keeps going back in front of the Planning Commission for errors.

At what point does the Land Use Commission have the opportunity properly to -- we don't know why the Planning Commission made such an error, but it's clear that they made such an error, but at some point sending it back to them merely prolongs our ability to consider on a full record this serious allegation of harm.

MR. CHIPCHASE: I completely understand your point, Commissioner. When I wrote that in 2012, it was so long ago I didn't need glasses. So I know this case has drug on for an indeterminate period, and it's frustrating for us.

We would have hoped that this Planning

Commission not only would have followed the right

procedure, but would have reached a better decision.

It didn't, and there's nothing to be done about that

now except send it back.

If we overlooked the error, then it's an appealable error to the court however this comes out, then even that will prolong it even farther.

This is our chance to cut off the error, send it back on remand, denial and remand. Have them do it right, procedurally, certainly substantively, we hope, then argue, then bring it back to this body with all speed possible for final decision.

CHAIRPERSON ACZON: Go ahead.

MS. VIOLA: I'm going to track back a little bit to some of the questions regarding whether or not the remand can be limited. The City would argue the Land Use Commission can limit the basis of the remand. They can state that the purpose of the remand is to consider and to essentially remedy the

incomplete record, to complete the record so that

Planning Commission can demonstrate compliance with

its rules, specifically not to reopen the entire

matter and have it drag on and to have other issues

being brought up that were already resolved by the

Planning Commission.

So I would disagree that every remand completely reopens the case. For example, again, back to the Glover decision that the Land Use Commission has recently decided upon. In that matter, the Land Use Commission remanded for the limited purpose of considering additional evidence.

So the Land Use Commission made that determination and did not remand to reopen the entire matter.

So I think I would disagree with both

Office of Planning and KOCA's representation that

remand in and of itself allows the reopening of the

case. The Land Use Commission has the ability to

limit it.

CHAIRPERSON ACZON: Commissioner Okuda.

COMMISSIONER OKUDA: Question for the City. Following up on our point about limitations on the remand. So is it the City's position that on remand the Intervenors or any other Party would be precluded

from raising the issue of potential recusal of Chair Hazama or anyone else who might have made public comment before hearing the evidence?

MS. VIOLA: No, the City would not argue that that would be precluded, because that is in the context of the final decision-making by the Planning Commission, that is not on a substantive aspect of the case.

So if you remand the matter back to the Planning Commission to apply the proposed Decision and Order to the parties, that they consider in the context of coming up with that order, it could be consistent with the nature of that order that KOCA could bring up the argument regarding --

COMMISSIONER OKUDA: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON ACZON: Commissioner Estes followed by Commissioner Cabral.

COMMISSIONER ESTES: I think at one point the attorney for the City made -- said that the Land Use Commission followed a certain procedure, and I didn't quite get what that was, that it would divest the Land Use Commission of the final decision.

MS. VIOLA: If the Land Use Commission, pursuant to 15-15-96(a), if the Land Use Commission comes to the final decision on the matter by

approving the modification or denying, that would divest the Land Use Commission of further jurisdiction over this matter, and therefore, if it was remanded and decision came back, it would potentially not be considered remanded and newly revised Decision and Order from the Planning Commission.

COMMISSIONER ESTES: That sounds like a pretty good idea to me.

CHAIRPERSON ACZON: Commissioner Cabral.

commissioner Scheuer opened this gate, and I wanted to somewhat support an unbelievable amount of frustration. I come from Hilo where being a simple-minded person with our landfill problems with hundreds of inches of rain a year.

Aside from that, I think that this has been going on for 30 years and yet it appears at this point the amount of time, effort and money -- money, money, money of lawyers and staff, members of the community, state, county, I'm sure federal has been involved, and the City and the public even coming for hearings and stuff, I just can't help but believe we probably could have built another landfill by now with the amount of money spent on legal fees.

I'm a practical person. I would have been

bankrupt 29 years ago with all of this. So my question, again, seems likes there is a catch 22.

Nothing we can do right at this point without somebody challenging it. And it will just be wrapped up for another 30 years, and the landfill will continue to potentially endanger the community.

When I read that in the event of these different things, this huge amount of the community has to be put on notice about potential danger, I thought this is really over the top that all of the smart people in this room, with all the suits and ties and whatever, can't get it together and figure out how to solve the problem rather than how to kick the can further down the way for whatever purpose.

My question I guess came up, Mr. Yee brought up the idea that potentially -- I think it was Mr. Yee, if not I apologize -- if we were to do something with -- again, seems like we can do nothing right here. If we were to deny, and each party involved could sign and agree that they would withdraw or waive their right to an appeal of that denial, because that's one of the, again, catch 22, if we deny it, then all of these legal proceedings allow for certain things to happen should any one of these parties decide to go down that road.

I would like to maybe have whichever party wants to comment. If people would in fact waive potential right to appeal a denial in order to proceed with the remand in order to proceed with a solution with my thought that the idea is to solve the problem, not continue to discuss it for another 30 years.

MR. YEE: You're perfectly right to ask that question, but that wasn't my question. My question was the waiver of the provisions that would prohibit the review of this matter six months after denial.

So you have a rule that says you don't reconsider a Special Permit denial for at least six months, or you don't look at the same permit for at least six months. That should be waived by the parties and should ask if the parties, are they agreeable to waiving the application of that rule.

Your question about asking to waive appeal is a much bigger question. It was not raised by me.

COMMISSIONER CABRAL: It's fairly clever -thank you for the clarification.

CHAIRPERSON ACZON: Commissioner Chang.

COMMISSIONER CHANG: I have two questions.

One for Ms. Viola.

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Would you agree that while you argued the Land Use Commission can limit the remand, once it goes back to the Planning Commission, the Planning Commission has the discretion to open the hearing?

MS. VIOLA: I would argue that in order to comply with the procedural requirement as well as the directive of the Land Use Commission, that that would not be an option for the Planning Commission. That the nature of their consideration would be limited to the grounds for which it had been remanded.

COMMISSIONER CHANG: Even if the consolidation and the comments by the parties to the proposed order may substantively change or raise an issue that may not have been considered, would you still argue that the Planning Commission would not have the discretion to reopen the hearing?

MS. VIOLA: I would argue the Planning

Commission would not have discretion to reopen the

hearing, because what they're being directed to do is

to consider the record, underlying record in 2008 and

2011 proceedings, and to provide Decision and Order

based on that record as directed by the Land Use

Commission.

So that would not open up the Planning

Commission's discretion -- but that would not allow

the Planning Commission the discretion to reopen the case.

COMMISSIONER CHANG: Do you advise the Planning Commission?

MS. VIOLA: No, I do not.

You raised the question of default entitlement. If the record is not deemed complete and the matter is remanded back, would you still argue that there is a potential default entitlement under 91-13.

MR. CHIPCHASE: I believe the risk doesn't go away by characterizing the record as incomplete.

And I think Ms. Viola's comments on the Planning

Commission's ability to reopen the proceedings, even if it determined that was appropriate, that the City clearly views the record as complete, so complete that even if the Planning Commission wanted to reopen it, it couldn't. That is a complete record. That is what you have received. And you received a decision on that.

So going back and characterizing the record as incomplete, particularly when the City would not even allow the opportunity for the Planning

Commission to reopen it if it wanted to, raises in my mind a very real risk if you don't do one of the three things that the statute says you should do within 45 days, that it is deemed approval. And I think all of the parties would rather not run that risk.

MS. VIOLA: I'm characterizing the record as complete for consideration of substantive matter, the substantive arguments of the parties. The evidence and the testimony has already been compiled and the matter closed for both proceedings. So the substantive record has been completed.

What has not been complied with is the procedural requirement, the additional steps of allowing the parties to do additional argument.

That's the distinction I'm making. The remand would allow for further procedural activity, whereas a substantive argument would require a decision by the Land Use Commission on the application itself.

COMMISSIONER CHANG: And your argument is that the procedural defects would not result in a potential substantive change requiring reopening of the hearing?

MS. VIOLA: Yes.

MR. WURDEMAN: If I may. What the City,

ENV, is asking for is that we just have a pro forma rubber stamp process on remand. Just have the parties jump through the hoops. Give no weight to what it means to object and to make arguments, and to just send the same decision essentially back to the Commission. And that certainly shouldn't be the case, and that's something that the supreme court of the state wouldn't tolerate as far as due process goes.

And the Planning Commission, that Rule 2-75 of the rules of the Planning Commission exist for a reason. Exist because the parties should be allowed to make the appropriate objections and to make arguments and to allow the Planning Commission to consider those and respond accordingly.

And I believe they certainly do have the ability to, and the discretion to consider other matters as you're asking about, Commissioner Chang, and they should have that to ensure that due process is followed and this is done right.

It shouldn't be just sent back on remand to rubber stamp everything just to send it back. That's a serious due process violation that the City, ENV, is requesting from this Land Use Commission.

CHAIRPERSON ACZON: Let me ask the

Commissioners if they have additional questions.

Commissioner Okuda.

COMMISSIONER OKUDA: Slightly related to this. Will the City waive any claim that a remand without denial could be considered a deemed approval?

MS. VIOLA: Yes, the City would concede that a remand without a denial would not result in an automatic approval, would not trigger 19-13.5, that we represent that based on the law that we would be unable to make that argument.

If I could, I just wanted to address something Mr. Wurdeman said. I don't believe that the proceeding that the City is recommending would result in rubber stamping.

As the City has acknowledged, based on Commissioner Chang's questions, the exceptions could result in a change in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, D and O by the Planning Commission.

So we are not just stating -- just going through the process for purpose of going through the motions, there is a possibility that the Planning Commission could change their findings and their conclusions and their order based on the arguments of the parties. But the arguments are limited to the

record that is below, it's not going to be the opportunity of the parties to reopen the case and prolong the proceeding any further.

The exceptions are essentially based on the proceedings below and the fact that the matter has already been closed.

CHAIRPERSON ACZON: Vice Chair Scheuer.

VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: I wanted go back to what I understood your response to be to a question from Commissioner Chang, this is regarding whether the allegation of Mr. Hazama properly participated in the proceedings.

I believe Ms. Chang asked, and you answered affirmatively that the Land Use Commission, when this matter comes back before us, should we remand it, as you are suggesting, we could actually bring up the question of whether or not Mr. Hazama had properly participated in the proceedings?

MS. VIOLA: Yes.

VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: So that is a very different reading, sort of narrow reading that we can merely affirm, deny, remand or approve with modification, because that's --

MS. VIOLA: But at this point when the matter is before the Land Use Commission presently

with the option to remand before them, we're saying that you cannot deny, approve, or modification, take action on the application in order to remand.

So if it's remanded and the matter of Chair Hazama, the appropriateness of whether or not he should recuse himself, if that becomes a matter that they consider -- the Planning Commission considers, and becomes part and parcel of their newly recommended D and O, then that would be before the Land Use Commission appropriately in the next round.

VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: But if the Planning

Commission chose to not consider or to deny a motion

by KOCA on Chair Hazama's remand, and then a new

Decision and Order was sent up to Land Use

Commission, would we be allowed to inquire on that

that matter whether he had properly participated?

MS. VIOLA: I would anticipate that if Chair Hazama does not recuse himself, that matter would be brought to the attention by a motion by KOCA similar to what you already have before you.

VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: But they couldn't bring a motion to us on Chair Hazama's participation?

MS. VIOLA: Yes.

VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: You believe they could?

1 MS. VIOLA: Yes.

MR. YEE: I believe it is not brought to you specifically or solely as to whether or not Chair Hazama should have participated. It is brought to you as -- the decision should be denied or the Special Permit should be denied because Chair Hazama inappropriately participated in the decision-making. So you don't simply decide whether or not Chair Hazama should have participated, you decide whether or not that participation affected whether or not you're going to approve or deny the application.

VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: So assuming, Mr. Yee, we deny at that point, they have at least six months until they could come before us again?

MR. YEE: Well, they -- yes, it goes to appeal to the Supreme Court, but in the meantime they could file a new action.

VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: And in the meantime they still don't have a valid Special Use Permit, correct?

MR. YEE: That be would be correct. And so if you are asking what is the unhappy choice you have before you --

VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: I have a few -- go ahead.

MR. YEE: So that would be -- I mean 1 2 arguably could you deny and remand? We would face 3 those questions, you know, if and when we reach it. But you wouldn't simply decide to remand, 4 5 it would be -- simply decide as to whether or not 6 Chair Hazama properly participated, you would be 7 deciding in the context of the decision itself. 8 CHAIRMAN ACZON: Commissioner Okuda. 9 COMMISSIONER OKUDA: This is related to the 10 completeness of the record. So are we being told that the record is 11 complete except for these procedural issues? 12 13 MS. VIOLA: Yes. Our position is that the 14 record is incomplete based on these procedural 15 issues. 16 COMMISSIONER OKUDA: But the evidentiary substantive portions of the record are complete, is 17 18 the City's representation? 19 MS. VIOLA: Yes. COMMISSIONER OKUDA: Is it the City's 20 position that the matters related to Chair Hazama's 21 22 participation is relevant to affirming, in anyway 23 affirming or supporting the decision or not relevant 24 to that?

MS. VIOLA: Well, the response that I gave

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to this question I think when you asked something similar before is that in the context of remanding the matter for the Planning Commission to make a decision and order, then it would be appropriate at that time -- or it would be allowable at that time for KOCA to argue whether or not Chair Hazama should recuse himself or not. So that's the context of that argument.

COMMISSIONER OKUDA: There's no dispute that Chair Hazama did make the statements alleged by Mr. Chipchase's client, or Mr. Chipchase and his papers to the present; is that correct?

MS. VIOLA: No. I would disagree. Chair Hazama would disagree with that representation about it as well. So that matter has not been resolved.

COMMISSIONER OKUDA: Would we have transcripts?

MS. VIOLA: And Chair Hazama said that those statements were taken out of context.

MR. CHIPCHASE: If I may.

COMMISSIONER OKUDA: We're not making any judgment about who's telling the truth or not telling the truth, because obviously that record is not before us. But if -- please don't take my question to indicate my feelings one way or the other in this

matter, but just to clarify my thought process here.

statement?

If, for example, any one of us

Commissioners would make a statement to the Star

Advertiser stating that we vehemently oppose the

continuation of the Waimanalo Gulch Landfill before

the matters are brought to us, would the City believe

that that's a basis to demand the recusal of

whichever Commissioner made that type of public

MS. VIOLA: Again, it would depend on the context. If that Commissioner, upon questioning, would further explain that even though they might have that preconception, that they are open to evidence, consideration of the record, everything before them to make an unbiased opinion, then that argument that they should be recused should be weakened.

COMMISSIONER OKUDA: I understand that, and this goes to the record, because what I saw in the record -- and I might have misread something -- but I didn't see any transcript of what took place in the executive session of the Planning Commission with respect to Chair Hazama; is that correct or not correct?

MS. VIOLA: The executive session is

privileged discussion, so that wouldn't be part of the transcript.

COMMISSIONER OKUDA: Would not be part?

MS. VIOLA: Yes.

COMMISSIONER OKUDA: If there is a remand, is the City going to object to Chair Hazama being allowed to be cross-examined by parties in interest about exactly what he told the media or anyone else about his views on the instant matter before the Planning Commission rendered its decision?

MS. VIOLA: At this point in time the City would prefer not to commit to any position except what we have indicated in our papers is that we don't agree with the grounds for that remand, that we do not believe that Chair Hazama had to recuse himself.

But in terms of our proceedings alone, I would reserve the right to essentially determine how to proceed when that issue faces us before the Planning Commission.

COMMISSIONER OKUDA: Okay. So he might be allowed to make a statement about what he said, but he may not be allowed to be subjected to examination to determine the -- I don't want to say the truthfulness of the statement -- but how much weight he would give to the voracity of the statement?

MS. VIOLA: That would be up to the Commission.

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COMMISSIONER CHANG: Just one final question to the City.

In general, would you agree that when we say the record is complete, we're usually talking about the evidentiary record?

MS. VIOLA: I would say no. I would say that in this circumstance, based on the law as it's stated in 205-6 (e) and the rules, it also repeats the basis for the remand, that there is some discretion by the Land Use Commission to determine what constitutes complete record.

Because the statute does not specifically provide for remand as the rule does, the only way to read the ability to remand with the statute is to state that the prerequisite to making a decision has not been satisfied, therefore, the record is not complete. So the record in terms of complying with all the evidentiary requirements, as well as the procedural requirements.

So that would be a reasonable interpretation of the statute and the rules, reading them both together.

So in this situation it wouldn't

necessarily be limited to only the evidentiary portion, but would extend to the complete matter including procedural compliance by the Planning Commission.

COMMISSIONER CABRAL: Again, to the City and county.

According to the information I have in December of 2004 it was indicated that the landfill would be full to capacity in 15 years, which would bring it up to 2019, which is coming critically close. I don't know the current status on that fill, but also there was a number of time limitations on when it should be closed.

Is anyone looking for a new site at this time? Or are we just all spending time on this case?

Is there any effort in a new site going on?

MS. VIOLA: One piece of evidence regarding the capacity of the landfill, there is other evidence in the underlying proceeding that would essentially argue very adamantly that it doesn't expire in 2019.

COMMISSIONER CABRAL: That was what the county council selected on their statement that it was projected it would be filled in 15 years, so that was coming from the council.

MS. VIOLA: I'm pointing out that's one

statement. That there is other evidence in the 1 2 record, as well as the updates that provided to the 3 Land Use Commission that talks about the continued 4 diversion of waste which would extend the life of the 5 landfill. 6 So that one statement is not necessarily 7 accurate at this time, as the Land Use Commission ENV Annual Report to the Land Use Commission would 8 9 indicate. 10 COMMISSIONER CABRAL: So that means no one is looking for another site? 11 MS. VIOLA: No, that's not true either. 12 13 CHAIRPERSON ACZON: Commissioner Cabral --14 Commissioner Wong. 15 COMMISSIONER CABRAL: Thank you. VICE CHAIR WONG: Chair, I wanted to move 16 17 for executive session to consult with the board's 18 attorney on questions and issues pertaining to the board's powers, duties, privileges in regards to this 19 20 motion in front of us. 21 CHAIRPERSON ACZON: Is there any second? 22 COMMISSIONER CABRAL: I'll second. 23 CHAIRPERSON ACZON: Moved by Vice Chair

Wong and seconded by Commissioner Cabral to go into executive session.

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1 VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: We have not dispensed 2 with our asking substantive questions. 3 CHAIRPERSON ACZON: We can go back and ask additional questions. 4 5 It's been moved and seconded. Those in 6 favor say "aye". Opposed? Motion carried. 7 (Executive session.) CHAIRPERSON ACZON: We're going to continue 8 9 with Commissioners questions. 10 Vice Chair Scheuer. 11 VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: Moving aside from the procedural morass, which we are in, I have a question 12 13 for Ms. Viola. 14 On the substance of the record, the 15 Planning Commission has given proposed Condition No. 16 3 to delay closure of the landfill until I think it's 17 December 2022. MS. VIOLA: I think the December date is to 18 identify alternative site. I believe that the 19 20 deadline applies to the designation of an alternative 21 landfill site, but the deadline for landfill is to 22 capacity. 23 VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: So the Hawaii Supreme Court found that the Land Use Commission had erred 24

earlier in this proceeding by not having enough

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substantive information supporting our proposed closure date in 2012.

MS. VIOLA: I believe that the Supreme

Court ruled that the Land Use Commission abused its

discretion because the Findings of Fact didn't

support the deadline.

VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: Do you believe the Findings of Fact in the record, and which you say is all but procedurally complete, have support for that new date of 2022?

MS. VIOLA: Well, the deadline is to capacity, so not until 2022. That designation is to identify alternative landfill that should be operative at the point when Waimanalo Gulch reaches capacity.

But I believe that the record supports the landfill operating at full capacity, and I do believe that the record also supports the designation of many alternative sites.

VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: And you believe the record supports that a determination by

December 31st, 2022 of a new site would provide sufficient time for a new landfill on that site to be opened and operational by the time that the existing landfill is filled to capacity?

MS. VIOLA: No, I don't agree that that is 1 2 what the record supports. The record supports the 3 designation of the landfill, it doesn't support the creation or the establishment of a landfill when 4 there is an existing landfill available. 5 6 VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: But this landfill can 7 operate under the proposed order until its capacity? 8 MS. VIOLA: Yes. 9 VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: Is there any of date 10 in the record that suggests when that capacity might be reached? 11 12 MS. VIOLA: No, that date is dependent on 13 the physical capacity of the landfill. 14 VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: Is there a range of 15 date? 16 MS. VIOLA: There is a range of date I 17 think indicated in the updated reports to the Land 18 Use Commission, because that date is not specifically 19 determined, because as with technology, with advances 20 by the department diverting waste from the landfill, 21 the life of the landfill is extended. So it's a 22 moving deadline based on the continued reduced use of the landfill. 23

at, is there a specific date for choosing of a new

VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: What I'm trying to get

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landfill on December 31st, 2022, that's presumably related to having a new landfill available by the time in which the existing landfill has reached capacity under the --

MS. VIOLA: Yes. But that 2022 deadline is not the date where the City is going to identify the site that is going to be present at that point available to use.

 $\mbox{ \begin{tabular}{ll} VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: I understand that, \\ \\ \mbox{that's not my question.} \end{tabular}$

My question is: Is there in the record substantial evidence that shows that that date, plus whatever time it would need to take from going from site selection to having an operational landfill sufficient, will that come late enough -- or early enough before the filling of Waimanalo gulch?

MS. VIOLA: So your question, if I may restate:

Is the 2022 deadline sufficient to allow for the City to have an operative landfill when Waimanalo gulch reaches capacity?

VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: Is there evidence in the record that that is the case?

MS. VIOLA: Yes, there is evidence in the record to support the landfill being operative until

it reaches capacity, and the designation of an alternative landfill; there is also evidence in the record that the City would be capable of identifying another potential site.

VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: Well, are you going to help me, Mr. Yee?

MR. YEE: So the Findings of Fact in the Decision and Order sets forth a 2022 date by which the landfill -- the alternative landfill is to be identified, the replacement landfill.

The Findings of Fact also state it will take seven or more years between the time to identify a site, the time you can have an operative replacement landfill.

I think the question is: So then by

December 31st, 2029, is there something in the record
that says that the replacement landfill would, by

December 31st, 2029, will there still be capacity in
the existing Waimanalo Gulch Sanitary Landfill, or
would that capacity have been reached one, two, three
years earlier, so that there would be a gap between
when the Waimanalo Sanitary Landfill is filled.

VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: You're getting at the gist of my question.

MR. YEE: The Findings of Fact don't

explain that. Perhaps it's somewhere else in the record. That would -- and there is also nothing in the Findings of Fact that explain why December 31st, 2022 is the selected date or time.

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So you don't know if it's related to the amount of time they need to find an alternative site?

Is it related to the fact of when the Waimanalo Gulch Sanitary Landfill will reach capacity? That's not explained in the Decision and Order.

Presumably when this is remanded, the Planning Commission will have an opportunity to either supplement the record or explain in their Findings of Fact the basis for that decision.

VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: Thank you.

I have more for you, Ms. Viola.

 $\hbox{ The record $--$ the Planning Commission} \\ \\ \hbox{denied further evidentiary proceedings request by} \\ \\ \hbox{KOCA.}$

MS. VIOLA: Both KOCA and the City -- the City requested to reopen the record to submit new evidence as well.

VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: So when was the last time new evidence was entered into this record?

MS. VIOLA: It was before the Planning Commission. I don't know the specific date, but

before the Planning Commission closed the record and
before they made the decision.

VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: But it's been a number of years?

MS. VIOLA: Yes.

VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: So regarding some questions earlier from Hawaii Island Commissioner, any further efforts, if there have been any, by the City to identify new sites that are not in the record right now?

MS. VIOLA: Well --

VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: Since the evidentiary portion of the record was closed.

MS. VIOLA: That's a little bit of a trick question, because the evidentiary portion of this case has been closed, however, pursuant to the 2008 SUP, the City is required to provide annual reports to the Land Use Commission on the landfill, on its capacity, on waste diversion, on siting, finding a new site, all of those issues.

So the City has been providing to the Land Use Commission, as well as Planning Commission and the parties, updated annual reports to reflect that information.

So in terms of the underlying proceeding,

that updated information on the landfill is not included.

VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: So you would believe that the Land Use Commission could properly consider any of the information in the annual reports in addition to the information contained in the record?

MS. VIOLA: Yes.

VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: Do any of the other parties, the Intervenors, have the chance to review or question anything that's in your annual reports as part of these proceedings?

MS. VIOLA: No.

VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: That's it.

MR. WURDEMAN: May I make a comment?

CHAIRPERSON ACZON: Go ahead, Mr. Wurdeman.

MR. WURDEMAN: These same questions that are being asked by the Vice Chair are the same kind of questions that were asked by the Land Use Commission back in 2009. And the evidence in the record at that time was a statement made by City representative that it would take at least seven years to find a new site.

And in considering that, the Commission entered, as part of its order, a requirement that on or before November 1, 2010, that the City start

1 making those efforts.

All of the information that I've seen to date, other than just any initial selection site, is the City talking about alternative waste management at its current site.

I think, honestly, other than just them making this initial site, it appears to me that they've made absolutely no efforts whatsoever to look for alternative sites since the Land Use Commission, back in 2009, required them to do so.

So that's my understanding of what is going on with that.

CHAIRPERSON ACZON: Anybody else?

COMMISSIONER CHANG: Just a followup

question.

So without reviewing, the parties -- I know the parties have not had an opportunity to submit comments on the proposed Decision and Order. Were those going to be some of the comments to the proposed Decision and Order's inadequacy of the record to address specifically the Land Use Commission's previous instructions to the Planning Commission on remand?

Was that the basis for both KOCA and the City's motion to reopen the record to include

specific evidence related to those kinds of questions?

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MR. CHIPCHASE: Commissioner, part of our motion to reopen, and my memory is a little -- a portion of it certainly was to address the progress on selecting a new site. We believe that that's a critical question. Has the City sit done what they're supposed to do and made an effort for a new site, new landfill -- not just identifying a new landfill, the condition for a decade now has been to identify a site. And the record was closed in this matter in 2012. So when we went back, we had a motion pending to reopen before.

When we went back, we renewed it. The City also brought a motion to reopen to submit additional evidence. And we took a position supportive of reopening provided that we had an opportunity to submit evidence on this point and to potentially introduce witnesses. Across-the-board the Planning Commission denied reopening.

CHAIRPERSON ACZON: Anybody else? Since there is no further questions, Commissioners, what's your pleasure?

COMMISSIONER ESTES: Cut and run.

CHAIRPERSON ACZON: Vice Chair Wong.

VICE CHAIR WONG: I move to approve in part and deny in part the motion to deny the remand filed by the Ko Olina Community Association and Maile Shimabukuro. I believe this matter cannot be both denied and remanded.

If the matter is denied, based upon HRS 205-6, 205-19 and 91-14, it can only be appealable. Accordingly, the matter shall be remanded to the Planning Commission for further proceedings in accordance with HAR 15-15-96(a) to address the following:

- 1) to clarify whether the Planning

 Commission followed Section 2-75 of the Rules of the

 Planning Commission in issuing its Findings of Fact,

 Conclusions of Law and Decision and Order.
- 2) clarify the basis of the Planning
 Commission's proposed additional Condition No. 3,
 which specifies a December 31st, 2022 date by which
 the Applicant is to identify an alternative site that
 will be used upon the WGSL reaching its capacity and
 the implications it has on the closure date of the
 WGSL to use and all waste and the subsequent
 commencement of operations at the alternative
 landfill site;
 - 3) clarify whether the record needs to

include updated information on the operation of WGSL, the landfill site selection process, and the waste diversion efforts of the City and County of Honolulu;

- 4) assuming the Planning Commission eventually approves this matter, clarify the effective date of the Planning Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision and Order, and;
- 5) clarify whether the Planning Commission is ruling on both the 2008 Application and the 2011 Application in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision and Order.

My motion is based on the review of the Motion to Deny and Remand, the oral and written arguments of the parties, and the record in this matter, including the Planning Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision and Order.

With respect to KOCA/Shimabukuro's argument in their Motion to Deny and Remand that the participation of the Planning Commission Chair, including voting on the matter, violated their rights to due process, I believe that this issue is not within the jurisdiction of the Land Use Commission, and therefore denied as a basis of the remand.

COMMISSIONER CABRAL: I'll second that.

CHAIRPERSON ACZON: Seconded by

Commissioner Cabral. There is a Motion to Remand to

Planning Commission for further proceeding to address
the five specific items.

2.1

Commissioners, we are in discussion.

would urge the parties, and specifically going back to the Planning Commission, that there be a timely action on this. I realize that over the last five years much of that time has been spent in trying to settle, but we realize that just didn't happen.

So while we cannot dictate to the Planning Commission its time period and its own schedule, we would urge the Planning Commission to take timely action on this matter.

COMMISSIONER OKUDA: Mr. Chair, I plan to vote in favor of the motion, if I can state the two reasons for it.

One, it is based on the expressed representation that has been made that this remand will not be constituted or argued to be any type of automatic approval of any pending matter; and also that no one has disagreed with that position.

So I take silence to be essentially an admission by silence.

And the second thing is, while I do agree that the issue of potential recusal of the Chair of the Planning Commission is not a basis for the remand, I'd just like to state for the record that, at least for me, I recognize what the Hawaii Supreme Court stated in Mauna Kea versus Board of Land and Natural Resources 136 Hawaii 376 at page 389 where, even though the Hawaii Supreme Court was speaking or citing from cases dealing with judicial decisions, it was discussing what an administrative agency, that being the Board of Land and Natural Resources, did in that case. And I quote what the Hawaii Supreme Court stated here that:

In the administration of justice by a court of law, no principle is better recognized as absolutely essential then that every cause, be it criminal or civil, and the parties involved therein, are entitled to -- and the Supreme Court quoted from United States Supreme Court case here:

Cold neutrality of an impartial judge.

And so recognizing our Supreme Court's admonition of having the cold impartiality of the decision-maker, even though I recognize the motion does not cover that, I'm aware of the admonition of the Hawaii Supreme Court. And those are my

1 statements for the record.

2.1

CHAIRPERSON ACZON: Thank you, Commissioner Okuda.

Anybody else? Vice Chair Scheuer.

VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: I'm trying to be as polite as I can in echoing Commissioner Chang's communication of the sense of urgency on the parties, particularly on the Planning Commission.

I think parties who believe they have been aggrieved in this matter have waited far, far too long for some kind of meaningful finality.

I think for a member of the general public, when they understand that they get a ticket leaving their car parked in a meter for too long, but the county can operate a landfill for years without a permit, does not encourage people's general faith in government and in our operations. I'll stop there.

CHAIRPERSON ACZON: Thank you, Vice Chair Scheuer.

Commissioner Cabral.

COMMISSIONER CABRAL: I would like to express that same concern. As I read through all of this, and again, I'm in a small business, I almost feel like it's been somewhat of a shell game or some intentional -- one has to wonder if there's not

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conversations over the water cooler, that, oh, well,
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2
     we'll just keep pushing this around legally and we
 3
      will never have to close this landfill or deal with
 4
      it.
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                And so I think that since this will come
 6
     before us again, I would urge the Planning Commission
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      to deal with this in a really responsible and timely
8
     manner. Thank you.
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                CHAIRPERSON ACZON: Thank you, Commissioner
10
     Cabral.
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                Anybody else? Hearing no further
      discussions, Mr. Orodenker, please poll the
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     Commissioners.
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                EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
      The motion is to deny in part and grant in part
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16
      instructions to the Planning Commission for further
17
     proceedings.
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                Commissioner Wong?
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                VICE CHAIR WONG: Aye.
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                EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: Commissioner Cabral?
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                COMMISSIONER CABRAL: Aye.
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                EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: Commissioner Mahi is
23
      absent.
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                Commissioner Chang?
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                COMMISSIONER CHANG:
                                     Aye.
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-McMANUS COURT REPORTERS 808-239-6148 -

1	EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: Commissioner Scheuer?
2	VICE CHAIR SCHEUER: Aye.
3	EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: Commissioner Estes?
4	COMMISSIONER ESTES: Aye.
5	EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: Chair Aczon?
6	CHAIRPERSON ACZON: Aye.
7	EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
8	Oh, wait a minute. My apology. Sorry I missed you,
9	sorry.
10	Commissioner Okuda?
11	COMMISSIONER OKUDA: Yes.
12	EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: My apologies. Thank
13	you.
14	Mr. Chair, the motion passes.
15	CHAIRPERSON ACZON: Thank you. Since the
16	Motion to Remand was voted on by the Commissioners,
17	the other option items on this document are rendered
18	moot. Than you very much.
19	Next item on the agenda is an executive
20	session. Motion?
21	COMMISSIONER CABRAL: I'll move to go into
22	execute session for other matters.
23	CHAIRPERSON ACZON: Any second?
24	VICE CHAIR WONG: Second.
25	CHAIRPERSON ACZON: Moved and seconded.

——McMANUS COURT REPORTERS 808-239-6148 ——

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All in favor say "aye". Opposed? Motion carries.
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                 (Executive session.)
                 (The proceedings adjourned at 12:03 p.m.)
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                   ——McMANUS COURT REPORTERS 808-239-6148 ——
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1	CERTIFICATE
2	STATE OF HAWAII) SS.
3	COUNTY OF HONOLULU)
4	I, JEAN MARIE McMANUS, do hereby certify:
5	That on May 24, 2017, at 9:00 a.m., the
6	proceedings contained herein was taken down by me in
7	machine shorthand and was thereafter reduced to
8	typewriting under my supervision; that the foregoing
9	represents, to the best of my ability, a true and
10	correct copy of the proceedings had in the foregoing
11	matter.
12	I further certify that I am not of counsel for
13	any of the parties hereto, nor in any way interested
14	in the outcome of the cause named in this caption.
15	Dated this 24th day of May, 2017, in Honolulu,
16	Hawaii.
17	
18	
19	S/S Jean Marie McManus
20	JEAN MARIE McMANUS, CSR #156
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