1	LAND USE COMMISSION
2	STATE OF HAWAI'I
3	Hearing held on February 21, 2019
4	Commencing at 9:00 a.m.
5	Maui Arts & Cultural Center, Higashi Meeting Room
6	One Cameron Way, Kahului, Maui, Hawaii 96732
7	AGENDA
8	<pre>IX. Call to Reconvene X. Continued Action</pre>
10	XI. Adjournment
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14	BEFORE: Jean Marie McManus, CSR #156
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      APPEARANCES:
      JONATHAN SCHEUER, Chair
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     NANCY CABRAL, Vice Chair
      AARON MAHI, Vice Chair
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      DAWN N.S. CHANG
      LEE OHIGASHI
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      ARNOLD WONG
     EDMUND ACZON
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      STAFF:
6
      PATRICIA OHARA, ESQ.
      Deputy Attorney General
7
      DANIEL ORODENKER, Executive Officer
      RILEY K. HAKODA, Planner/Chief Clerk
8
     BERT SARUWATARI, Planner
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      SCOTT DERRICKSON, AICP
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      DAWN APUNA, ESQ.
      Deputy Attorney General
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     RODNEY FUNAKOSHI, Planning Programing Administrator
      For State Office of Planning
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     MICHAEL HOPPER, ESQ.
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      Dept. Of Corporation Counsel
     MICHELE McLEAN, Planning Director
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      ANN CUA, Planner VI
      For County of Maui
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     RANDALL F. SAKUMOTO, ESQ.
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      CATHERINE TASCHNER, ESQ.
      LISA CATALDO, ESQ.
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     Attorneys for Pi'ilani South and Pi'ilani North
18
      CURTIS TABATA, ESQ.
      Attorney for Honua'ula Partners, LLC
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      TOM PIERCE, ESQ.
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      Attorney for Intervenors
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CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Aloha mai kakou, good morning.

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This is the February 21st, 2019 Commission meeting on Docket A94-706 Ka'ono'ulu Ranch.

I'll start off by noting that there were some individuals who came to us during our recess meeting and thereafter wondering whether or not public testimony had been closed on this matter.

I did accept public testimony yesterday morning, but we are in -- where we are in the proceedings when we recessed from here yesterday afternoon, we had had presentations from the Petitioner, from Honua'ula Partners and from the County of Maui, and Office of Planning, and we were about to proceed with the Intervenors' presentation.

Mr. Sakumoto.

MR. SAKUMOTO: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I realize it's the Intervenors' turn to speak, but if I may have just two minutes to clarify something from yesterday.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: You may proceed.

MR. SAKUMOTO: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Our reference to a modified original plan for the development, which included a cultural preserve, appears to have created some confusion.

And to be clear, and as stated yesterday, as a fundamental starting point, Petitioners are prepared to develop a project in substantial compliance with the original plan as reflected in the attachment to the 1995 D&O.

While not included as an exhibit to the Motion to Dismiss, that original plan is in the LUC's records and files in this matter. And all parties have long been on notice of that original plan.

We showed a modified version of the original plan yesterday that addressed the comments received during our community outreach efforts. As indicated yesterday, the Petitioners were willing to include a cultural preserve within the property.

Significantly, and as also stated yesterday, the Petitioners believe that development of the property with this preserve was also substantially compliant with the original plan.

The comments and questions received yesterday appear to reflect a belief or concern that the modified original plan is fundamentally different from the original plan, and may therefore raise various issues during these proceedings, including whether the parties were prejudiced by reference to the modified original plan shown yesterday, or

whether additional proceedings are required to consider the modified original plan.

Based on the concerns raised, and to eliminate any confusion, and to streamline this hearing, the Petitioners withdraw the modified original plan and further consideration of it, and reiterate their intention to develop the project in substantial compliance with the original 1995 plan.

Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Okay. So we spent a considerable amount of time yesterday morning discussing whether or not -- not going onto the substance of anything, we were backing out of the driveway on the road trip and kind of got caught in the driveway on whether or not this particular thing should be entered in, and was part of the record of this hearing.

Now, you're trying to withdraw it from the record, is that correct?

MR. SAKUMOTO: I'm not withdrawing it from the record, I'm just saying that we introduced it in the spirit of compromise as something which we felt was a project that people could get excited about.

Instead, it created a lot of confusion and concern, which was not our intention. And, you know,

we feel that that result was unintended, and we would like to do something now to try to provide some clarity going forward.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Okay. Here's what

I'm going to do. I'm going to ask the different

Parties whether they have an objection to what you're

going to try to do, and I will ask the Commissioners

in that order whether they have questions on this.

Honua'ula?

MR. TABATA: We have no objections.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Maui County?

MR. HOPPER: The county, consistent with its original position, just wants to know and have the Commission know what is going to be developed and have a clear plan for that.

So we don't object, I don't think, to that action, but would like time to review a clear plan of what's going to go forward and have the Commission have time, and the parties have time to comment on what plan is actually going to go forward, because we weren't sure until yesterday.

I think that's our position.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Office of Planning?

MS. APUNA: We have no objection.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Intervenors, Mr.

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Pierce?

MR. PIERCE: Mr. Chair and Commissioners, this is about as vague as what was presented yesterday, so there's really no difference. So we'll respond in the process of our responding to the Motion to Dismiss.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Commissioners?

Commissioner Chang.

COMMISSIONER CHANG: Yes. I greatly appreciate the county's comments, because I think that that's personally where I'm at is I'm not really sure what's being proposed.

The pleadings reference we're going to go back to the original plan, but yesterday we received a modified plan. And I want to be very, very clear.

I applaud the Petitioner for spending the time last year to really consult and work with the community. I applaud you for doing that, because I think that was your representation, and that's probably what should have been done.

And I think what you are proposing, the cultural preserve, a lot of the things reflected what the community, their comments during that one-year period. Again, I applaud that effort. And what I don't want to see happen is the Land Use Commission

be someway responsible for not -- for now a project that's not going to adhere to the community's concerns. That's just me.

But anyway, what I do want to say is, so I, like the county, am not sure what's being proposed.

And I'm very uncomfortable with where we are in the Order to Show Cause, because I don't know whether you have complied with all the conditions, in particular, Condition No. 15, because I do not know what plan is actually being proposed.

So I, like the county, again, I appreciate the county's comments about wanting to see the plan. And I'm a little reluctant about proceeding without really knowing -- because I can't make a determination whether there's been a violation or not, if we don't know what the plan is.

So, again, appreciate the county's position. I feel very similar to what the county is saying about wanting to have a plan come forward that we can determine whether there's any violation of Condition 15 or not. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Commissioners, other comments?

I think here's where we are at procedurally.

In the middle of the first motion that was on our agenda, Motion to Dismiss. Mr. Pierce has not had a chance to present his case. I think we need to let Mr. Pierce present his case.

After the presentation, the Commission can ask any further questions of the party and then enter into deliberation.

We now have on record that yesterday it was your possible plan, and now it's not. So we will weigh that accordingly.

Our options in front of us during deliberation would include either granting the Motion to Dismiss, denying the Motion to Dismiss, or possibly a third option which has been raised by Maui County to defer action on this Motion to Dismiss and schedule for a hearing on what exactly the proposed project is.

With that said, Mr. Pierce, are you ready to proceed?

MR. PIERCE: Intervenors are prepared to proceed.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Please go ahead.

MR. PIERCE: Thank you.

And I just want to first, on behalf of myself and behalf of the Intervenors, express our

thanks and gratitude to the Commission. We know you've had an extremely busy schedule here on Maui. We appreciate you being here on Maui, and we really appreciate, what I know has got to be a difficult task, digging into this case which has such a long history before you.

- So with that, if you will grant me a little bit of liberty, because of the, what I would call really a surprise to us yesterday in terms of some of the new presentations that are being made that weren't in the Motion to Dismiss.
- I would just ask for you to give me the liberty of a little bit of time to try to work through each of these issues with the Commission.
- And, Mr. Chair, if you find that I'm at some point taking too long, please, feel free to speak up on that.
- CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: It's never stopped me before. About how long? What is your estimate?
- MR. PIERCE: I'm going to guess. I'm always wrong on these, but I would need a little more time than I normally would ask for, but I expect ten to 15 minutes, along in there.
- CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Okay, that's fine.
 Please go ahead.

MR. PIERCE: So I first just want to give the Commissioners a road map of some of the issues I think need to be addressed in order for you to really understand why the right thing to do is to deny this Motion to Dismiss.

So I want to identify these at the get-go. The first thing I think you need to understand a bit more is a bit of the timeline going all the way back to 1995.

Second thing is we have to deal with this issue at some point in this, dealing with substantial commencement. Now, it's Intervenors' position that that issue is not properly before the Commission at this time, because we're not in Phase II.

But whether or not the developers have substantially commenced, they argue that it is important in making their case on the 365-day rule. So I'll address that briefly.

The third thing is, I want -- I hope that when I have concluded, that you are with us with the Intervenors on the point that Order to Show Cause hearings are not conducted based upon promises of developers. They're conducted based upon verified evidence taken in a contested case proceedings, and determining what have been the actual actions of the

developers, not their promises.

So if I leave you with nothing else, I hope that's one of the things you come across with. To just give you a precursor of that, all that took place in Phase I which was concluded in 2013.

The next point is, which really is what this Motion to Dismiss is all about, is really a surreptitious attempt to reopen Phase I.

So the next thing that I want to hopefully leave you with is that the Commission lacks the power to reopen Phase I.

The other thing is that it appears what the Petitioners are seeking to do, and as per the purposes of today, whether they are done with genuine interest in doing the right thing or not, the question is, is the Commission in a position to assist the Petitioners in the way they're asking to be -- to receive assistance.

And that is in the middle of an Order to

Show Cause hearing, is the Commission able to fashion

some type of special protections to the Petitioners?

And right now what's being proposed by the county and

Petitioners is that we defer yet again, and kind of

see what happens.

But I want you to know at the end of my

arguments today that the Commission would be entering into unchartered territory where there are no Commission rules that permit those activities, because we are in an Order to Show Cause hearing, which has very strict requirements, and that's -- the legislature did those, and we're stuck with them.

I actually want to state that I can recognize and sympathize with the Commission's desire to come up with a pragmatic solution. The question is whether the rules, and the way that this case is now before us, whether you are able to engage in pragmatic solutions like that.

What I want to conclude with is that even if you deny this, or when you deny this, it is the most prudent and cautious approach the Commission should take, and you are acting here in a adjudicatory capacity. And it's always -- usually the correct approach is for bodies who are deciding decisions like this to take the prudent cautious approach, not the extreme approach.

And the dismissal of the Order to Show

Cause hearing would be the extreme approach. That's

the one the Petitioners are asking for. Instead, I

want to show you at the end that the Petitioners are

in a position, if they really want to -- we don't

know exactly what it is -- but if they want to come up with something that's radically different from what they were proposing in 2012, there's a method for them to do it; and they should do it by the rules, not through some ad hoc process.

So those are the points that I want to make and hopefully you'll be able to follow me as I go through these.

Motion to Dismiss comes up is because back in late

November we filed a Motion to Conclude. And the

Motion to Conclude actually was ironically extremely
simple. It simply asked for three procedural steps
that would have provided for an orderly process. It
said lift the stay pending since 2013, conclude the

Phase I findings, which would provide an opportunity
for us to deal with all the issues associated with
the findings from the previous Commission members,
and then begin the evidentiary hearing for Phase II.

But what I want to say before that is that there is a great deal of discussion about why the Intervenors -- yesterday, about why the Intervenors stepped away from the design process, the community outreach process that was being suggested by Koa Partners.

We have bent over backwards to try to accommodate the proposals of the developers subsequent to the 2012 hearing, 2012 and 2013 hearing.

But what is the backdrop that my clients, who were here, Maui Tomorrow, South Maui Citizens for Responsible Growth, and Daniel Kanahele each represent very unique interest. Maui Tomorrow and South Maui Citizens for Responsible Growth, the whole point of their being here is because they want to make sure that planning is done right on the Island of Maui, and specifically in Kihei, which has significant planning problems.

We also have Mr. Kanahele who is here, who wants to make sure that all the cultural rights are preserved.

So what we were constantly doing as we were evaluating the developers' proposal was testing them back against the 1995 Decision and Order, because it had to meet that, and also had to be consistent with the Commission's rules.

What we found was, as we continue to look at that is that there is no way that they were ever going to be able to present a plan that would be appropriate at this point in time, 25 years after the

1995 Decision and Order. And why is that? You have traffic patterns have changed since 1995. The traffic reports are absolutely stale from that. You have businesses and developments that weren't foreseen or contemplated back in 1995 that now exists, or that where they already have the entitlements and they're going to be proceeding forward.

All of those have economic, social and traffic related facts associated with whether or not what the Petitioners are now proposing would be appropriate.

The market conditions have changed radically. And the state law has changed. We now have a much more robust cultural law requirements than we had in 1995. So the question -- the Petitioners are saying dismiss Intervenors' Order to Show Cause hearing, and let's proceed upon a Decision and Order that's 25 years old and is based upon reports that are worthless. Let us go forward.

And we're not sure exactly what it is we're doing yet, but let us go forward anyway. You should dismiss this because you can trust us. That is not a prudent course of action for this Commission.

So that's why we were here and request a

Motion to Conclude, and we are sorry that it's created the complications in terms of how the motions have been filed subsequently.

One of the things I would like to point out is -- mentioned yesterday -- that there had not been a withdrawal of the Motion to Amend. But there was a formal statement made in July of 2018 on the record where it was clearly stated that the Petitioners were abandoning the Motion to Amend.

There is no reason to take that in any form or fashion except that it's been withdrawn. And I think that's important in terms of procedurally where we are in the case.

In fact, one of the other things that the Petitioners have consistently recognized during the past year is that they would need a stipulation of Intervenors in order for them to be able to proceed with anything, and they know that because we are in the middle of an Order to Show Cause hearing.

Certainly that's one of the reasons they filed the Motion to Dismiss. If they can get rid of the Intervenors, then they can do whatever they want with the Commission. They no longer have a say.

But the Commission -- we had to file a Petition to Intervene. We had to state why our

rights were sufficiently strong enough to where we should be granted the same party status as everyone else here at the table. And the Commission, after deliberating on that issue and reviewing the arguments and the submissions, concluded that we should have a seat at this table.

So we're asking that we continue to have a seat at this table, which means that you would deny the Motion to Dismiss.

So if I may briefly just talk about the timeline which I think would be helpful.

The reports were started being prepared for Ka'ono'ulu Ranch, the original Petitioner back in probably 1993, 1994. They were proposing 123 lot light industrial complex. Importantly, their whole presentation was that there would not be a significant increase in traffic, because those lots were going to be purchased by small business owners.

Essentially what they were going to do, was they were just going to create lots, stub them out, and then sell them, and then let each of the small business owners come in and do their own build out of the project.

They said this is going to be an opportunity for small business owners. They said

this is going to provide local service to the hotels and retailers. It was supposed to be very concentrated focused in that area.

And the Commission based a lot of its decision-making on that, and certainly that's what the 1995 Decision and Order is based upon.

What's really an important point to note is that the original Petitioner said that these would go on the market fast, and that certainly made sense because all they had to do was go in do some small grading, stub out, paving, and then they would have the lots available. And this is confirmed in No. 22, Finding of Fact No. 22 of the Decision and Order.

It says: Petitioner anticipates that the project will be available for sale to the public in the fourth quarter of 1996. 1996. And that the entire project can be marketed by 2000.

Of course, it would take time to sell those lots to each one of the small business owners. But they were anticipating that they would be -- and in fact, some of the representations upon which that finding were based upon, and I will look back at it, they were talking about the fact that it was going to be very easy for them to get the project done.

But after the 1995 Decision and Order was

granted, what happens? Ten years go by with the original Petitioner doing nothing. Ten years. And I want the Commission to remember the fact that they have a ten-year rule in their Commission rules, which really bring into question the viability of a project that doesn't go forward in a timely fashion.

So what happens in 2005 is that the original Petitioner sells Maui Industrial Partners.

And the best way of describing what happens then is that Maui Industrial Partners goes rogue. They stop submitting annual reports for the years 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009.

I want to bring to attention one of the things that the Petitioners argued yesterday as a bit of a tangent. Yesterday they argued, well, we're in compliance with Condition 17 regarding the annual reports now, because we are going to be filing them and we submitted post filings for the old ones.

Well, that's not the purpose of annual reports. The purpose of annual reports is to provide timely notice to the public, to the county, and to the Commission as to what activities are happening.

No one had an opportunity to challenge what Maui Industrial Partners went on to do. And what they want on to do during that period is to develop a four

lot subdivision. And the purposes behind this four lot subdivision, irrespective of what the Petitioners may say, was clearly to sell three of them to Pi'ilani Promenade, which they ultimately did for retail shopping, okay.

What has been called the mega-mall, because it's hundreds of thousands of square feet of retail shopping. Had nothing to do with light industrial. And then they sold the other part for affordable housing, something that is -- neither one of these had ever been before the Commission back in 1995.

And what I would point out is that the other thing the Petitioners talked about, and this goes to the substantial commencement part, the Petitioners are arguing that they spent millions of dollars already. Well, if you look at the rules, and you look at the Aina Le'a case, it says very clearly that the development activities must be in substantial compliance with the Decision and Order.

That means that Maui Industrial Partners, when they went rogue, were their activities consistent with the representations? No. In fact, what we have is at the conclusion of Phase I, Office of Planning drafted their Findings of Fact No. 45. The Petitioner's current proposal to subdivide the

Petition Area into four, rather than 123 lots, and then lease space, rather than sell lots, is not in substantial compliance with the Petitioner's original representations in 1994. That's coming from the Office of Planning.

So to the extent -- and this would require an evidentiary hearing and an opportunity for Intervenors to cross-examine the witnesses -- to the extent that the Petitioners are arguing that any of their development activities that they say were substantially commenced, the Commission has an obligation to determine whether they were done in support of a conforming project.

And the answer already is, no. That was already concluded in Phase I.

So the point I make is now going back to the timeline, because I got off on my timeline there momentarily. We're now at the stage of 2005 where Maui Land & Pine -- excuse me -- Maui Industrial Partners purchases the land, and then they hold onto it, and then they sell it.

And I would just point out to the Commission their own rule, 15-15-79 which says, performance time, petitioners granted district boundary amendment shall, not may, it says shall make

substantial progress within a reasonable period as specified by the Commission.

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15 minutes now.

We already know 1996 was the date from the day of approval of the boundary change and development of redistrict area. The Commission may act to amend, nullify, change, reverse its Decision and Order if the Petitioner fails to perform as represented to the Commission within the specified period.

Why does it make sense with that rule and the Commission rules for us to be contemplating promises that were thrown upon us yesterday at the last minute, then changed again? We know nothing about them. They're simply vague promises made by the Petitioner.

Why would the Commission, with these types of Commission rules, saying there's a certainty involved when you're granted district boundary amendment? Why would we be dismissing the Order to Show Cause hearing, and continuing on at that level? CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: You're at the

MR. PIERCE: Thank you.

So what I would like to do now, and of course, we also have the separate rule

15-15-50(c)(19), which is the ten-year rule, which says that there is a ten-year requirement. Once again, there is an opportunity to nullify.

What I would like to do very quickly, Mr. Chair, is just talk about the 365-day rule. That's the timeline.

And I guess I need also to finish off the timeline very quickly, is that we filed our Petition for an Order to Show Cause, Motion for Order to Show Cause back in August of 2012 after we found out about the retail shopping center complex and the affordable housing.

And it's really critical for the

Commissioners to know that at that point in time the

primary arguments that were being made by the

Petitioners were that the frontage road didn't work,

and that none of the agencies wanted it; that there

was no market for light industrial; and that broad

commercial uses were permitted by the 1995 D&O, and

housing was permitted.

And we went through a five-day -- this is in contrast to what the Office of Planning attorney said yesterday. It really was a mischaracterization of what happened back when we had our hearing. And I would just point out, I have two boxes here of the

evidence. We have two boxes of evidence. There were hundreds of exhibits that were submitted. We took the testimony of numerous witnesses, and these even included Martin Luna. Mr. Martin Luna who was the attorney for the original Petitioner.

So these were all steps that were taken before the Commission decided in Phase I that there had been a violation.

So what I would point out is that the Petitioners continually are making inconsistent statements to the statements they made earlier.

But after that phase, after Phase I, when it was clear that Intervenors had prevailed, and the Commission made an oral ruling at a hearing like this after hearing all the evidence, and found that the Petitioners were in violation of Condition 5, relating to the frontage road, 15 relating to substantial compliance, and 17 relating to annual reports.

At that point in time they asked for their stay. And they said the Intervenors won't suffer any prejudice. We cited all this. I'm not going to spend a lot of time, but these are direct quotes.

Intervenors will suffer no prejudice because of the stay. The stay does not terminate this action. No

1 prejudice results to anyone. These are all quotes.

A stay operates merely to preserve the status quo.

So at any rate, once the Motion to Amend is determined, then the Commission can ascertain whether to proceed to Phase II, that was another one of their quotes.

And I want to go to one other thing Mr. Sakumoto was asked about yesterday.

Someone asked: What was originally promised by the Petitioners? Was it that they would do no construction during the stay, or before the stay, or no development? And Mr. Sakumoto said that, oh, no, it just related to construction.

That's entirely not consistent with the Petitioner's representations. And I just need to give you just a couple of examples of the quote.

In response to one of our motions to try to conclude back then, the Petitioners argued, contrary to Intervenors' assertion, the public is not being harmed by the procedural posture of the stay.

Then they go onto say: We have not committed to take any action to develop -- this is a direct quote -- the subject property.

Then they go onto say: Where there's been no violation yet, because the '95 Decision and Order

was based not on actual construction or development, but rather on a proposed plan and development. In other words, they were arguing that they were just making proposals at that point. There had been no development.

Honua'ula represented that it had no present intention to commence construction or development. Those are direct quotes. Pi'ilani has not begun any active development of the Pi'ilani parcels. Thus, while there was an intention -- this is their words -- an intention to develop the Pi'ilani Promenade project, and plans were made for said project, no actual development of the land at issue has commenced. No actual development.

There's nothing in there that's the type of parsing that Mr. Sakumoto was talking about yesterday.

So what I would just point out by those, is that with respect to the 365 rule, and with respect to the Petitioners' arguments, they have consistently said that this Commission was going to have its powers later on to continue to oversee this, and that Intervenors would still be a party and have a right to continue the case.

What I would just add, with respect to the

365-day rule, is that the language of Aina Le'a -well, the first thing I'll point out is that the
Petitioners' description of 15-15-74(b), that's what
they're really hanging their entire 365-day argument
on. That section, and I think this is one of the
places where I'm in agreement with the County of
Maui, the County of Maui says that rule is
inapplicable in an Order to Show Cause hearing.
That's how I understand the county's argument. We
would agree with that.

And it says, that particular rule says it's for District Boundary Amendment Petitions, and the point is that here the hearing before us was actually one that we initiated. If anyone was entitled to conclusion, it was the Intervenors were to entitled to have an earlier conclusion and still being out here. So it has nothing to do with the Petition that was filed where the -- where there's a time-sensitive issue with respect to whether the Petitioners can proceed with the development.

What I would just point out is the Aina
Le'a, despite the Petitioners' arguments, that you
have to read the entire document. Aina Le'a, I think
the court went out of their way to make this as clear
as possible regarding the Commission's authority.

Said it twice. Said it once and this language was actually quoted by Commissioner Okuda yesterday.

They said it once. And then they said it again two pages later, and I think it's worth reading to the

Commission the second quote:

The proper procedure to be followed by the LUC in ruling on the OSC, therefore, depends on whether the Petitioner has substantially commenced use of the land in accordance with its representations.

That's the language that Aina Le'a said.

Where the LUC issues an OSC, and seeks to revert property based on a Petitioners' failure to substantially commence use of the land in accordance with its representations, the LUC is not required to follow the procedures otherwise applicable to boundary changes.

Thus -- and I'm going a little bit

further -- thus when a Petitioner has not

substantially commenced, the LUC may revert the land

without following the procedures set forth in HRS

205-4. I think this clearly states the 365-day rule

is not application. And that's really the issue that

is properly before the Commission right now.

I think that I've probably addressed for

the Commission this issue of substantial commencement sufficiently, so I'll skip over that.

What I would like to also point out is that we are in the middle of an Order to Show Cause hearing, and that is governed by 15-15-93, that section is called Enforcement of Conditions, Representations or Commitments.

And what it states is -- I'm going to once again paraphrase. It says: When the Commission has reason to believe that there's been a failure to perform -- doesn't say based upon promises -- it says the failure to perform according to the conditions imposed, the Commission shall issue and serve upon the party -- and it goes on and says -- why the property should not revert to its former land use classification.

That same section goes onto say that: If it concludes that there has been a violation, the Commission shall amend its Decision and Order to incorporate the Order to Show Cause by including the reversion of the property to its former land use classification, or to a more appropriate classification.

The point I want to make with that is that there's nothing in there that provides the Commission

with the ability to fashion a special remedy for a Petitioner who is making promises like here. That may be unfortunate for us, maybe it would be a better thing if it didn't, but the legislature hasn't given the Commission those powers yet. And under the circumstances, the Commission is left with the simple task of moving to Phase II, which we are requesting, and determining whether or not the land should be reverted.

What I would ask you to just -- the final thing is with respect to the surprised design that we received yesterday, is if you put yourself back in the shoes of the Commissioners who sat through the five-day hearing back in 2012 and 2013, and many other additional hearings like these where we were dealing with procedural issues, at the conclusion the Commission stated that there were violations. What if at that point in time the attorney for the Petitioners had reached into the emergency briefcase and pulled out a design and said, wait a second, actually, we're ready to proceed based upon the original plan.

What would the Commission have done in that situation? They would have said "too late". We just completed an evidentiary hearing. You had every

opportunity before and during to present something different, but you adhered and stuck to your retail shopping plan and your affordable housing plan.

The point I want to make is that Phase I is concluded. The Commission cannot undue Phase I.

They cannot. This is one of the big points in their Motion to Dismiss, they say that the Commission can't enter Findings of Fact because the facts have changed.

This goes to a final point here. We are in the middle of an Order to Show Cause hearing. Mr.

Lake presented the design yesterday as a public testifier. Public testifiers can come and say whatever they want, but that doesn't mean that it was introduced into evidence as part of the contested case proceeding. Only parties can do that. And it has to be done pursuant to the rules. And those rules provide very clearly that there's an opportunity to put the witness on the witness stand, and for the Intervenors to have an opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses.

That is how evidence is properly presented, and that's why, by the way, our Motion to Strike is proper is because all of the information in there, we have had no opportunity to review that.

So in conclusion, and I think the

Commissioners were giving me the liberty of a long
argument, we're asking you to take the cautious
approach. The dismissal that is being argued, the

Motion to Dismiss is an extreme resolution. It's not
really a resolution, it's an extreme decision that
really would create more problems.

It would throw out the contested case that was completed after very diligent work by the prior Commission members. It would enter the Commission into undocumented territory where there's no rules permitting these types of activities. It would be based upon nothing more than Petitioners' promises. And the question I would ask is, what kind of trust should we give to the Petitioners at this stage when they have flipped and flopped over arguments over the past six years, and when they, for lack of a better word, they sandbag the Parties by providing a design at the last minute yesterday that we had no opportunity or recognition of before; and then they reversed their decision and made something slightly different today.

Why would this be a good cautious, prudent approach for us to proceed on upon based upon those types of promises?

What we're asking instead is our Motion to Conclude takes the cautious approach. It asks for you to take the deliberative steps, maintain the contested case evidentiary proceeding protocol that's laid out in your rules, and take it step by step in a way where a good record is made for all the Parties, not just Petitioners, not just Intervenors, but all Parties.

The final thing I would state, this is really not harmful to the Petitioners. If they really in their heart of hearts want to go back to a design similar to this, why don't they do it the right way and start with district boundary amendment? Get the reports done properly, present it to the Commission, and do it the right way where there is an opportunity for the community process that is laid out in the Commission rules.

For those reasons we're asking you to deny the Motion to Dismiss. And I thank you very much for your attention.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Thank you, Mr. Pierce.

Commissioners, questions for Mr. Pierce? I wasn't prepared for that. Are you going to save me, Gary? Commissioner Okuda.

COMMISSIONER OKUDA: Mr. Pierce, I recognize this proceeding is not necessarily governed by Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure, but what is the standard of review that this Commission should apply?

COMMISSIONER OKUDA: Yes, for this specific Motion to Dismiss.

MR. PIERCE: For a Motion to Dismiss?

MR. PIERCE: Well, a Motion to Dismiss -that's actually a very excellent question. I thank
you for that. And it's one of the things I've
overlooked.

In a Motion to Dismiss the facts are to be taken from the perspective of -- all reasonable doubt is to be put on the person who's being knocked out of the case, because the law affords a trial on the merits.

So what essentially is happening here is, that after we are partially through a trial, the Petitioners are asking for us to be knocked out upon the pretences that they propose.

So what the law says is that when a defendant -- ordinarily it's a defendant -- in this case it's the Petitioners come in and seek to dismiss a party and cause them to lose their rights. The law says that you have to look at the facts and the law

in the light most favorable to the Intervenors in this instance. That is the standard.

So that means to the extent that there are questions in your mind as to what you should be thinking about right now, you need to consider them in the light most favorable to the Intervenors because they are the movants of this whole Order to Show Cause hearing. Thank you for that question.

COMMISSIONER OKUDA: The reason why I asked that question -- I'm not aware of what -- or a Hawai'i case, it may be that other counsel can help me out on that. I'm not aware of a Hawai'i appellate case that lays out the standard with respect to administrative agency.

Because as we all know, those of us who do litigation, right, if it's in court and it's a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), you treat what's filed by the claimant as being totally true.

In other words, you don't get into whether or not there is a factual dispute. If it's a motion for summary judgment, under Rule 56, you look to see whether or not there's any dispute as to material fact. And if there is a dispute as to material fact, then you let the investigation, the fact-finding process go forward with the case.

I'm just trying to figure out which standard do we apply with respect to an administrative agency, and what's the case, if any, in Hawai'i, or legal authority that says we have to apply the standards?

In other words, do we just say, well, look, gee, if the Intervenors on their paperwork makes it look like they have a claim, which the law provides a relief for, we just have to take your word for it?

Or do we apply standards saying, well, if we believe there are really material facts in dispute, we have to let the process go forward?

Or if it's a jurisdictional issue, like Mr. Tabata raised, I think that's similar to Rule 12(h), I think it is, you look and determine the jurisdictional issue, and that's just done by the paperwork.

I'm just trying to find out what standard are we supposed to follow.

MR. PIERCE: Let me help in this way. I don't have a case that I can cite, but what I can say is we have to look at the procedural process of this case. Phase I has been completed, and the Intervenors prevailed in Phase I.

So the question is -- this is one of the

reasons it's been difficult to actually respond to this Motion to Dismiss is that the reasons presented by the Petitioners don't really bear any resemblance to anything that happens in the law.

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You don't moot a case. And on this point I must disagree with Office of Planning, and with what they stated in their response. They stated that if the Petitioners are now -- the first assumption is that somehow or other the Petitioners have the ability to cure their violations. And you have to think about it from the perspective that Phase I was concluded, and it was based upon everything that happened in this timeline over here.

You don't have the ability to perspectively, or look into the future to see whether you can resolve those. That's a new issue. That's why you have new district boundary amendments, where petitions -- or motions to amend.

So the point I would just make there is that we're in the middle of an evidentiary hearing. We have already prevailed. Why would it be appropriate for us to be dismissed?

And I want to point one thing on this jurisdictional issue. I'm glad you mentioned that, and it was in my notes here.

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I think the jurisdictional issue, as presented by Mr. Tabata, is incorrect. And all the time it happens in cases where statutes of limitation -- and here in a way this 365-day rule is a statute of limitation. Statute of limitations may be tolled on all sorts of different purposes. Sometimes they're tolled equitably, sometimes because two parties want it to be tolled.

What I mean by "tolled", stops the clock, stops the clock from running. Mr. Tabata argued that it was non-waiveable or unwaiveable, and that is not the case. It may be that it's held off. But as Aina Le'a says, I think the issue is really a red herring, because Aina Le'a says, you first got to look at whether there's been substantial commencement. If there's been a substantial commencement as represented by the parties in the original Decision and Order, if that hasn't been met, then the 365-day rule is inapplicable anyway.

So just going back and trying to conclude that. Under the posture as we are right now, where we have been a prevailing party, where the Order to Show Cause hearing was stayed as a request of the Petitioner, why would it make sense under any shape or form of the law to dismiss the Intervenors at this 1 stage of the game?

2 COMMISSIONER OKUDA: Chair, if I can have a follow up question.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Yes.

Motion to Dismiss is not granted. Can you state for the record, so that we're clear, even though we've read your moving papers, what the Intervenors plan to do in Phase II, and how those actions are relevant to the issue that the Commission still has to decide or should decide?

In other words, what do you plan to do in Phase II? And number two, what's the relevance of those actions or the materiality of those actions with respect to decisions which the Commission has to make or should make?

MR. PIERCE: So we've identified three steps, procedural steps that would have to be conducted by the Commission.

First is lifting the stay. Because the stay has been what has kept the contested case from going forward. And the stay was conditioned upon a Motion to Amend being pursued. And we know that is no longer being pursued. That's the first step.

The second step is to enter findings of

fact, and all that requires is -- it requires the Commissioners to make sure that they have reviewed enough of the record. We have already cited this in our Motion to Conclude, so I'm just going to summarize it quickly.

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But we already have proposed findings of fact that were presented to the Commission, but which were never acted upon. So findings need to be entered for Phase I.

When we get to Phase II -- and this is a critical point -- Phase II is an evidentiary hearing. It's established to protect the Petitioners as well as Intervenors' rights. There's an opportunity for identifying the exhibits that are going to be provided. This is all laid out in the Commission's rules already. Establish the exhibits. This would all be done with the assistance of the executive officer. We've identified exhibits. The witnesses are going to be called. Then we would schedule the hearing date. And once that occurs, there would be a deliberate process where each piece of evidence is presented. There is an opportunity for them to be questioned before it's admitted, and the evidence of the testifiers has an opportunity to be cross-examined, as well as an opportunity for

rebuttal witnesses. That would be the methodical process.

Now, of course, there is one other possibility. And I want to mention the fact that before we ever filed a Motion to Conclude -- and this was talked about I think even in papers -- I contacted Mr. Sakumoto, because from our perspective it says, if the Petitioners want to do the right thing, why don't they just go ahead and agree and stipulate to reverter the property and start with the clean slate which is what this community needs and what the Commission rules requires. But we are not there, so we have to go through this reverter process.

On Phase II, I think the first step would be a motion as to whether the Commission even needs to hear evidence. And the issue of that is whether the prior statements of the Commissioners, as well as the status of the case is such to where there's no evidence to present. No evidence that they could present that would change the fact that they have not substantially commenced. That would be an opportunity for the Intervenors to properly brief that issue. But setting that aside there would be an evidentiary hearing.

COMMISSIONER OKUDA: I'm sorry, Mr. Chair, one final question.

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CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Please proceed.

COMMISSIONER OKUDA: Mr. Pierce, if the stay is lifted, isn't it true that -- or would there be anything that would prevent the Petitioner from starting to develop the property and, you know, as long as proper permits and other governmental approvals are received to go ahead with its development?

MR. PIERCE: We think that the Petitioners have no ability to proceed. And if they were, we could readily go into court and get a temporary injunction based upon the rulings from the Commission on Phase I. The Petitioners don't have a right to proceed right now.

One of the things I would like to point out is irrespective of our Order to Show Cause hearing, as we have already briefed, the Commission is in a position independently at any time to take matters into their own hands, and essentially nullify the 1995 Decision and Order, based upon the ten-year rule and some of the other rules that we've briefed in our pleadings.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Commissioners, any

other questions for Mr. Pierce? Commissioner
Ohigashi.

COMMISSIONER OHIGASHI: In their motion, they site that Condition No. 5 -- and Condition No. 5 deals with the front roadway parallel to Pi'ilani Highway.

If they submit a plan at this point to provide for that, would they be in violation of Condition No. 5?

MR. PIERCE: My answers are very -- it may not be one that the Commission likes, but I think it's what the rules require, which is that that decision was already made by the prior Commissioners in Phase I when they concluded that there was a violation.

And it's important to point out, once again, the rules state that it has to be based upon the activities and actions of the developer up to the point of the Order to Show Cause hearing. It's not based upon promises. It has to be based upon the actual actions that are presented in evidence.

And the evidence did not support them at that point in time, setting aside the fact that the frontage road, as I looked at the design yesterday, and as we looked at it, it's unclear exactly where it

goes or what it does, but it wasn't just that any frontage road would work.

I will actually look back at the findings of fact and conclusions, the decision, the original Decision and Order, and it had very clear statements as to what that parallel roadway was supposed to do in terms of traffic flow.

Now, the point I would just make at this stage was -- and I would actually point out is that I think that the Petitioners' witnesses at that point were actually fairly persuasive. They said at that point in time, Department of Transportation doesn't want a frontage road. They explain that, and they brought in witnesses to make that point. And they explained why it didn't make sense for a frontage road.

But if that's the case, then they need to start over and get it done right, and deal with what are the current existing traffic issues, not those in 1995.

So the question is, I guess, would it make sense, based upon this timeline that we presented to you, and based upon this incredible amount of time, even if the rules permitted it, would it make sense to discuss a frontage road where there is no traffic

- report to support a current traffic report or
 anything, or Department of Transportation or
 testimony or reports to state that it is helpful or
 if not, even a public health and safety issue.
 - COMMISSIONER OHIGASHI: Mr. Pierce, it was a simple question. So your answer was no, because they have already established violation?
- MR. PIERCE: That's correct, Your Honor.
 - COMMISSIONER OHIGASHI: You don't have to call me Your Honor.
- MR. PIERCE: It's a force of habit.

- 12 COMMISSIONER OHIGASHI: I call my wife 13 that.
 - The second part would be No. 17. It seems to indicate that they failed to file reports. Are you saying then that the reports that they have subsequently updated continue to be violation of rule 17?
 - MR. PIERCE: No. What I'm saying is that the harm was done from the lack of the reports back in the early 2000s. That was the opportunity for early notification to the public, to the agencies, as required by the public reports.
- And you can't unring the harm that was

 caused by that by promising or submitting new reports

1 that corrected past activities. You just can't do 2 that. And I guess just once again, as I was 3 grappling with this issue, and I'm trying to think 4 about it from Commission's perspective, what does the 5 Order to Show Cause hearing state in it? It doesn't 6 provide an opportunity -- if we were in court, and we 7 were -- and the court had equitable relief, perhaps in that kind of situation where intervenors had been 8 9 seeking injunctive relief, perhaps in that kind of 10 situation the court can say, well, look, I understand 11 that these guys are actually trying to cure things, 12 and that's okay. 13 But here, unfortunately, the legislature 14 didn't give the Commission the power to fashion those 15 kinds of equitable remedies to deal with this. They 16 gave the Commission one ability, which is reverter. 17 CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Do you have more?

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Do you have more?

I'm inclined to take a break.

COMMISSIONER OHIGASHI: I don't mind taking a break, but I would have a few more questions.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: That's fine, after the break. It is currently 10:04. We will start exactly at 10:14.

(Recess taken.)

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: It's 10:14. Thanks

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1 for being respectful of everybody's time.

2 Mr. Ohigashi, you were continuing with 3 questions for Mr. Pierce.

MR. PIERCE: Mr. Chair and Commissioner

Ohigashi, may I just add a bit more about your last question with respect to annual reports?

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Briefly.

MR. PIERCE: The point I just want to make, I'm not sure I was clear on this, those reports Maui Industrial Partners for those years that I mentioned in the 2000s failed to provide those. Those annual reports, not just documents that get submitted, they require a detailed discussion by the developers and the owners about what the status of it is and how they're continuing to meet those conditions.

If that information had been available to the public when it was required to be available, we might not be here right now, because we would have been able to identify the violations when Maui Industrial Partners started to go rogue.

One of the things I need to point out is, and this is in the record in the evidence, Mr.

Charlie Jencks, who was --

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Briefly.

MR. PIERCE: This is it.

Mr. Charlie Jencks submitted an affidavit to the county stating that there were no conditions or other aspects that did not permit him to move forward with this four-lot subdivision.

We know that's not the case. In fact, that's how the Commission concluded otherwise. So there is no way to undo that by promises or by correcting the record later on. That's no help to the public.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Mr. Ohigashi, please continue.

COMMISSIONER OHIGASHI: I'm just trying to focus in on what I think is the relevant issues today. And to me there's a Motion to Dismiss. The relevant issues is whether or not this specific violation cited by the Commission in its oral ruling, I guess, are correctable, not correctable, or still in violation absent -- I don't want to trick you or anything like that -- absent the proposed plan for the mall.

As I see it, the question turns to me is that would these violations exist if the original D&O was followed? And your statement -- I was trying to get No. 17, you're saying, yes, because No. 17 is a requirement that is just a requirement that they

failed to meet. I'm just trying to get --

MR. PIERCE: I hope -- the fair response, the fair response is if they had presented what they're presenting now. We don't know exactly what it is. In Phase I, when there was an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing, for the opportunity for cross-examination of the witnesses for full and thorough evidentiary fact-finding process, instead of what we are getting right now which is this willy-nilly promises from the Petitioners.

If that process had gone through, at that point in time we could have seen whether or not it worked. But there is no way for us to know that, without going to -- I'll give you one quick example.

They showed us a diagram yesterday of 110 lots. Well, what are those lots for? Do we know all the things that you, as Commissioners, have to think about from a district boundary amendment are important here?

What is the viability of the owner to carry it out? What are the market conditions? Are they going to create something that actually is no help to the community? How does it affect traffic? And that depends on the uses.

We don't know right now whether Honua'ula

Partners is planning on using some of that for affordable housing. Nothing is known to us, so there's no way for me to respond and say that would have been the case. What I can say is if it had been presented at the appropriate time in Phase I, then the Commission could have evaluated it. The Petitioners, when they had an opportunity to change and reverse course, did not do so. They went full speed ahead with retail shopping and affordable housing, and the Commission ruled, and that's the end of the discussion. Phase I is concluded. They cannot reopen it.

In order for them to reopen it, there's no rule -- I looked last night -- there's no rule that permits them to reopen Phase I. If they were, it just would make no sense at this stage.

COMMISSIONER OHIGASHI: So I'm not trying to get a dissertation from you, just trying to get a simple answer, if you permit me that simple answer to the question.

My simple question is regarding their concerns that they brought up in their motion about Condition No. 15, they made certain representations in Condition 15. This is what the Petitioner represented at the original hearing.

Do you have any specific objection to any of those items? And I'm not trying to trick you, but I think it was on pages 17 -- I'm just looking at it right now -- 14 -- I think it's 18 of their motion.

And I was just wondering if any of those representations, or if there should be more representations that you believe should be included in there, or is there any -- you know, Condition No. 15 is admittedly kind of vague. And it talks about all representations. So the question is, is that are those representations --

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: What is the question?

COMMISSIONER OHIGASHI: Do you consider

those are all the representations, or do you believe

that there are more, or have you any response to

that?

MR. PIERCE: And I'm going to attempt not to give you a dissertation, but it's not as simple as a yes or no question. The pages that you are referring to, on pages 14 through 18, Petitioners argue -- this is very important -- there is no evidence being taken here today. We are not in a contested case proceeding where there is evidence being taken currently. They argue that they're going to meet requirements -- by the way, they

cherry-picked what they want the Commission to focus 1 2 on out of the 1995 D&O --3 COMMISSIONER OHIGASHI: What I'm trying to 4 aet --5 CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Gentlemen, gentlemen, 6 our court reporter cannot record two people at once. 7 COMMISSIONER OHIGASHI: I just want to know if there is any other representations that you 8 9 believe is not included in there, or if you don't 10 have any. MR. PIERCE: And of course this is 11 12 insufficient for the Commission to base a decision to 13 dismiss on, because those representations are made 14 outside of an evidentiary hearing, and they're made 15 outside of Phase I. So they are not sufficient. 16 COMMISSIONER OHIGASHI: They may or may not 17 be. 18 MR. PIERCE: No, I'm not saying they may or 19 may not be. They're not sufficient because they 20 cannot ever be sufficient because of the fact that Phase I is concluded. 21 22 CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Briefly, are you 23 suggesting another option available to this

Commission to move this motion to a formal hearing

followed up on your last response?

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1 MR. PIERCE: No, I'm not suggesting that. 2 I'm suggesting that there should be no deferral of 3 the Commission's ruling today. They should deny the 4 Motion to Dismiss simply, and then consider our 5 Motion to Conclude in the procedural steps set forth 6 therein. 7 CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Commissioner Wong. COMMISSIONER WONG: Chair, sorry. To the 8 9 issues at hand and all this legal issues that I 10 cannot understand, can we move to executive session 11 so I can ask the board's attorney about our issues 12 about duties, privilege and liabilities on these 13 legal issues and what we have to do or cannot do? 14 CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: In terms of what 15 options are before us? 16 COMMISSIONER WONG: Yes. 17 CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: There is a motion made by Commissioner Wong to move into executive 18 19 session. Is there a second? 20 COMMISSIONER CHANG: Before we move into 21 executive session, can I ask --22 CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Hold on. There is a 23 motion on the table. 24 COMMISSIONER OHIGASHI: Second. 25 CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: There's a second from 1 Commissioner Ohigashi.

2 Commissioner Chang, if you want to speak.

COMMISSIONER CHANG: I'm going to oppose the motion, because I would like to ask Mr. Pierce a question before we go into executive session as it makes a difference for me.

COMMISSIONER WONG: I'll hold the motion until.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: The movant has agreed to at least temporarily withdraw the motion or hold on it. Does the seconder agree?

COMMISSIONER OHIGASHI: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Please proceed, Commissioner Chang.

COMMISSIONER CHANG: Mr. Pierce, I recognize and an appreciate that the Intervenors have been persistent. They have stood firm. They have participated throughout this very long process.

I also recognize that it is very likely that we're going to get an appeal from somebody on this matter. I also recognize this is an administrative proceeding, not a judicial proceeding. And so I tend to be -- Mr. Okuda tends to be in a very legal, just the citation. I tend to look at this in a very practical way.

We've had representations this morning from the Petitioners that have withdrawn the modified plan, they're going to go back to their original plan. And they said they're prepared to proceed.

We've also had comments from the county who said, if they proceed, we're going to ask for dec action from LUC.

So I guess my question to you, and whether you want to caucus with your clients is, because you've been standing very firm that under no circumstances at this point in time Phase I of the proceeding has concluded, and you can't even defer.

But I'm asking you whether the Intervenors would be willing to continue this hearing for a very short period of time, I guess continue this particular hearing, but whether it's deferral or continue for a month, which at that time we would then give the Petitioners an opportunity to fully submit to all of the relevant parties their plan, and how are they going to proceed with their plan, so that we have a fully developed record. So that should anybody take this up on appeal, because I will admit, I did not read the volumes of testimony that were presented in 2013 to the Commission. I was not there.

And there are findings of facts that were made, that has not been concluded yet. So for me to look at what is in the best interest of -- including your clients who is interested in preserving the cultural resources on the project. Looking at the -- reversion is a very drastic course of action for the Commission -- looking at the potential. Is this the set of facts that we want to take up on appeal, whether 365 days applies or not? I don't know.

So I guess I'm asking you this question:

Would the Intervenors be willing to continue this for one month, at which time we will have Petitioners provide us a full -- all of their plans and how they intend to proceed with the original plan that was the basis of the 1995 D&O?

And then at least I can make a determination whether they have -- whether they are in compliance with the representations that were made, because I think that's the obligation that we have.

So that's the question that I have for you right now.

MR. PIERCE: Thank you, Commissioner Chang.

I understand the question. If you'll bear with me
one moment.

So I first just want to address first the fact that -- I thank you for using kind words and saying that we have been persistent, and I'm sure some of the Commissioners or Petitioners and others may feel that we're being obstinate instead of persistent.

But what we think we're here to do is to understand, to the best of our ability, the Commission's rules.

So the question that you're asking is, would the Intervenors be willing to defer for a period of time. And what that unfortunately raises is a bunch of questions that I tried to present in my arguments relating to what the Commission's authority is at this stage under the current circumstances with the Order to Show Cause hearing.

The first one is -- and I was quite troubled by what I heard yesterday, so I spent some time yesterday evening. I pulled down the Order to Show Cause rules. This is 15-15-93 and, you know, one of the important ones: The Commission shall conduct a hearing on an Order to Show Cause in accordance with requirements of subchapter 7.

What that is really saying is it has to be done in a methodical approach, with taking of

evidence, like you normally do with contested case hearing. So far, that's why I am asking, and this is actually -- I'm glad the question was asked before you go into executive session -- the question I think that your attorney has to focus on is what is the Commission's authority to defer. And what's assumed in that is two things.

First, that the Commission has the power at this stage to reopen Phase I, and the only way that this could be done properly under the rules is for there to be an evidentiary hearing. Not the way the Petitioners have attempted to do this by having arguments by their counsel and then willy-nilly submitting declarations.

It has to be done in an orderly process.

But the question is whether you have the ability to reopen it. And based upon our look at the rules, you do not have the ability to reopen Phase I.

The second issue is, whether as much as any of us, including the Intervenors might like for the Commission to have the ability to take a practical pragmatic approach based upon the promises of the Petitioners at this stage, and giving them the benefit of the doubt in terms of their interest in being in good faith.

The question is under the Order to Show

Cause hearing process, whether you have the ability

to do that.

So I think there's an unfortunate tension here between what the Commissioners would like, and what the Commission rules permit. And from our perspective, for us to say that deferral, sure, we're okay with a deferral, is just acquiescing to a continuation of what we feel is a failure to adhere to the rules that are the Commission's rules.

COMMISSIONER CHANG: If I could add. I think during your argument when you were talking about the statute of limitations, that there are at times where the parties can stipulate. So I guess that's what I'm asking.

Notwithstanding your interpretation of the rules, can the parties stipulate to a deferral of this matter to provide the Petitioners what their representations are that they are going to develop this property as they represented in the original petition. So that's what I'm asking. Are you willing to stipulate to that?

MR. PIERCE: And on that part, I obviously haven't had a chance to check in with all my clients.

Maybe we can do that during your executive session.

What I would just say at the outset from just consulting with Mr. Hyde here for South Maui Citizens for Responsible Growth. You know, stipulation is a two-way street, right? There's two parties involved. And so far what Petitioners have been attempting to do is push this through unilaterally and to the prejudice of the Intervenors.

And, of course, none of this was ever presented. And Mr. Perez spoke yesterday. Mr. Perez and Mr. Hyde, none of the Intervenors have seen what was presented yesterday. If it were presented, and if the Commission's rules permit it, of course, we are open to considering it. However, after we have done our thorough review, that is why we have taken this persistent approach is because we didn't see another one.

But setting that aside, we are open of course to doing it. We need to see that they have actually engaged in a robust community involvement and not selectively taken certain parts of the community's -- we would want to see, just to restate that last part, we want to see robust involvement of the community.

COMMISSIONER CHANG: So is it your position that you're willing to stipulate?

MR. PIERCE: I think I need to discuss that 1 2 with my clients. 3 CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Okay. 4 MS. APUNA: Chair, can Office of Planning 5 provide some information that we think is pertinent to this discussion? 6 7 CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Any objection from any of the parties? 8 9 MR. SAKUMOTO: No objections. 10 MR. TABATA: No objection. 11 MR. HOPPER: No. 12 MR. PIERCE: No objection. CHAIRMAN SCHEUER: Please proceed. After 13 14 that I have one quick informational factual question 15 about the record that you prepared, and Commissioner 16 Cabral has a question for Mr. Pierce. 17 MS. APUNA: Thank you, Chair. So that rule section that Mr. Pierce 18 19 pointed to with regard to the Order to Show Cause 20 proceeding includes a section (c), that is 21 15-15-93(c) that says that any procedure in an order 22 to show cause hearing may be modified and waived by 23 stipulation of the parties. And informal disposition 24 may be made in any case by stipulation, agreed

settlement, order or default.

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1 And also subsection (c) says that the 2 Commission shall follow subchapter 7, which under 3 section 15-15-63(1) provides that at the hearing the 4 presiding officer may require the production of 5 further evidence through testimony or exhibits upon 6 any issue. The presiding officer may authorize the 7 filing of specific documentary evidence as a part of the record after the close of the hearing subject to 8 9 the rights of the parties to request reopening of the 10 hearing within a specified time after the receipt of 11 such evidence, or may keep the hearing open until 12 such time that evidence is received by the 13 Commission. 14 So I do believe the Commission is 15

authorized to, as Mr. Pierce said, reopen Phase I in order to receive additional evidence at this time.

> CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Thank you, Ms. Apuna.

My quick question for Mr. Pierce, solely based upon the record.

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Can you state in the record whether the Intervenors objected to the stay?

MR. PIERCE: Oh, yes, we did. We filed an objection to the stay.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Commissioner Cabral. And then after Commissioner Cabral, we will retake

the pending motion to go into executive session.

VICE CHAIR CABRAL: I want to follow up on fellow Commissioner Chang who commented that she's very practical, and I'm -- she is an attorney still, so somehow she can still follow all of this.

I am extremely practical in my world and not an attorney.

So I've watched this back and forth, very complicated, and I just keep wondering, and would like to think that everybody might bring it back to -- somehow we've gotten into who's right, who's wrong, who's wrong, who's right.

And I keep thinking, I think we lost what is best for the people and what is best for the community. And, Mr. Pierce, I don't know the background on your group, because I'm not from this island. So I just kind of am wanting to sort of ask everybody as this moves forward, to get back to the base, which in theory what was pertinent in 1995 is what are the needs of the community and how do we best serve them.

And I think I just would like to ask, if your group is community based, or what is going on that we can be assured that the community is really being represented? Maybe I'm asking who do you

represent? You say your clients, but I don't know who that is.

MR. PIERCE: Sure. I think what I can actually do is provide some reference to the record.

Maui Tomorrow is a large nonprofit organization here on Maui, and Albert Perez is here. And if the Commission will permit, it might be better to hear from him at the appropriate time. But hopefully I can paraphrase Maui Tomorrow's mission, which is really about sustainable and appropriate planning and development on the Island of Maui.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: A very brief listing of your clients right now.

MR. PIERCE: And that certainly is they have a very broad outreach, and are significantly known and have been very much involved in these issues along the way.

South Maui Citizens for Responsible Growth is more focused on this particular issue. But as their name suggests, they are interested in specifically what is happening in the Kihei/Wailea/McKenna area and making sure that the growth that occurs there is done in a responsible fashion. And once again, pursuant to the rules.

And finally, but certainly not last, Mr.

1 Kanahele, Daniel Kanahele, he really wears two hats.

2 He's been very involved in all issues relating to

3 South Maui where he lives with respect to sustainable

4 and responsible growth there; and as well he has

5 | continued in many different proceedings including

6 this one to make sure that cultural rights are

7 preserved.

VICE CHAIR CABRAL: Thank you very much.

And you've been to our group before, but I wasn't clear when you referred to who your clients were. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Commissioner Aczon, and then we are going to take up the motion to go into executive session.

COMMISSIONER ACZON: Same with Commissioner Cabral, I'm not a lawyer. Going along with Commission Cabral and Commissioner Chang, the Commission, the Land Use Commission's mission is to make sure the land is being used for the benefit of State of Hawai'i.

I think 25 years is enough with that. I think we lost track of those vision. So my comment is we talking about these groups and everything, and the more rules we throw out there, the more the parties are digging their heels.

So I don't really see any end game of this.

And the only thing is what, like Commissioner Chang
said, and that as she said has to be at least two
parties, cannot be one.

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So if the parties are willing to do that, I think we're going to get something. But if everybody is going to be digging at this rules and everything, I don't even know the end results that your clients are trying to achieve, short of reverting the property. If that's the goal, then we're not going to go anyplace. Just my comment.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: We're taking up the motion to move into executive session made by

Commissioner Wong and seconded by Commissioner

Ohigashi. Any further discussion on that motion?

COMMISSIONER CHANG: Mr. Chair, I know -
please bear with me.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: I will respectfully and kindly limit you to speaking about the motion to go into executive session.

COMMISSIONER CHANG: Just about the motion to go into ex -- I guess what I want to ask is much more broader than that. I want to hear from the other parties whether they're going to stipulate.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: That's outside the

motion that's in front of us. You're certainly free 1 2 to vote against the motion. Any further discussion 3 on the motion to go into executive session? Hearing none. All in favor of going into 4 executive session say "aye". Is there anybody -- and 5 I also vote "aye". Anybody opposed? 6 7 COMMISSIONER CHANG: I would oppose. CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Commissioner Chang 8 9 opposed. We're going into executive session. 10 (Executive session and recess.) 11 CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: We're back on the 12 record. 13 We were still following the presentation by 14 Mr. Pierce, asking questions of Mr. Pierce by the 15 Commission. 16 Are there further questions from the 17 Commissioners for Mr. Pierce? Seeing none, we are on the Motion to 18 19 Dismiss the Order to Show Cause. What is the 20 pleasure of the Commission? 21 COMMISSIONER CHANG: Mr. Chair. 22 CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Commissioner Chang. 23 COMMISSIONER CHANG: While I don't have a 24 question for Mr. Pierce, may I ask the other parties 25 the same question I asked Mr. Pierce. Whether they

would stipulate to a continued hearing on receiving
the Petitioners' plans?

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Please proceed.

COMMISSIONER CHANG: Petitioner, would you be willing to stipulate?

MR. SAKUMOTO: I think we would be willing to consider it once we understood the terms of the stipulation, and, you know, exactly what it means to go forward. We would like to hear more and then I think I would ask for some time to discuss it with my client.

COMMISSIONER CHANG: As I understood it, based upon, one, the Petitioners' original pleadings, which were that the Motion to Dismiss is because it's essentially moot. We are going to go back and develop as we had originally proposed. And then yesterday's hearing we received a modified plan, that today was subsequently withdrawn.

So my understanding, my questioning with Mr. Pierce was could we get an opportunity, or the parties stipulate to continued hearing to receive the Petitioners, your plans, and how it -- what are you proposing to do and when?

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Let me interject here. I believe that the Chair -- I don't think the

parties need to stipulate. If this Commission 1 2 chooses to schedule this for evidentiary hearing, I 3 think we have the power to do so without stipulation, 4 but it might give some of our members certain comfort 5 if the parties stipulated to that. 6 COMMISSIONER CHANG: Yes, thank you. 7 would give me much better comfort. CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Have you received a 8 9 response from the Petitioner? 10 COMMISSIONER CHANG: No. Now that you know 11 at least what I understood the continued hearing to 12 be on --13 MR. SAKUMOTO: So I would like time to 14 discuss that with my client. 15 CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Mr. Tabata? MR. TABATA: I would like some time to 16 17 confer with co-counsel. In addition, we would like 18 an opportunity to respond to some of the Intervenors' 19 legal arguments. 20 If we are not given that opportunity, we 2.1 would like to make objections on the record as to 22 what we would like to further discuss. 23 COMMISSIONER CHANG: County. 24 MR. HOPPER: I think that's consistent --25 CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: One second. I just

71 did not understand the last sentence from Mr. Tabata. 1 2 MR. TABATA: We are requesting an 3 opportunity to respond to Mr. Pierce's legal 4 arguments, as briefly as possible. I don't think it will take more than five or ten minutes. 5 6 Secondly, if we are not going to be given 7 this opportunity, we would like to make an objection on the record as to what he has said. 8 9 CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Thank you. 10 County, responding to Commissioner Chang's 11 question. 12 MR. HOPPER: I don't think we have an 13 objection to that process. 14 CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Thank you. Office of 15 Planning? MS. APUNA: We wouldn't object to that 16 17 process either. 18 MR. PIERCE: Mr. Chair, when I gave -- when 19 I responded to this question before, I did so without 20 having an opportunity to consult with my clients, and 21 they have asked me to clarify our position. May I do 22 so?

23 CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Please.

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MR. PIERCE: So first of all, I want to preface this by saying that we're, of course, open to any process, resolution process that the Commission thinks would be helpful. I'll preface it with that.

Having said that, and this is also speaking to Commissioner Cabral in terms of the refinement.

All three of my clients stand for what we can boil down as three important concepts.

Robust community input, transparency in the process, and adherence to the state and county land use law.

That's always been our guiding light in terms of how we have represented ourselves before the Commission on this case.

What my clients want you to understand is that they, back in February of 2018, initiated work with extensive discussions with community that involved Kihei Association, some of those meetings going all the way back to 2012. We had as many as 200 people at the meetings. So there was a lot of community folks there.

They also have consulted repeatedly with

Aha Moku Council as well as lineal descendants. And

in each one of those situations have gone through all

the different possibilities that can play out here.

They discussed all the pros and cons, including the

issue of reverter, which is one of the ones that the

Commissioners are concerned with, but also keeping at the forefront some of the primary concepts of the community you're interested in.

meetings was that the Petitioners were unable to present something that meets the needs of the community. And so, therefore, the community has -- and this is the Intervenors based upon their robust engagement with the community, they believe -- and also received the community's support that reverter back to agriculture was the best way to do this so that we can start over with a clean slate, new reports, that type of thing.

And this is more from me, but also was clarified by my clients. We don't want to be perceived as being somehow entrenched in a position that's unreasonable. If I may --

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Just to be honest,

I'm sort of lost a little bit on how you're

responding to Commissioner Chang's question.

MR. PIERCE: My understanding was would we be willing to stipulate to something other than the rule-making process. And the answer is --

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Specifically, right, one of our abilities is to schedule this motion made

1 by the Petitioner for an evidentiary hearing.

And the question from Commissioner Chang
is: Would you be willing to stipulate to that, even
though I said I don't believe that we need your
stipulation in order to schedule that?

MR. PIERCE: I may have misunderstood then. I apologize.

So there is no longer a proposal to have the parties continue to talk, but instead there would be an evidentiary hearing?

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Those two things are not mutually exclusive, but the question -- let me step back for all the parties' purposes and also address the issue raised by Mr. Tabata.

Right now, Mr. Pierce, all you're being asked is: Are you willing to stipulate -- knowing the stipulation is not necessary -- to the fact that one of the options in front of the Commission is to schedule this motion for an evidentiary hearing narrowly on that motion?

MR. PIERCE: On the Motion to Dismiss?

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Correct.

MR. PIERCE: And we don't know -- it's not being categorized as being part of Phase I or Phase II, just an evidentiary motion?

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: It's a hearing on that motion.

MR. PIERCE: I'm going to have to do the same as Petitioners and check with my clients on that.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Thank you. Briefly, Commissioner Cabral.

VICE CHAIR CABRAL: I just want to thank attorney Pierce for that explanation, because that was more of what I was asking, not just the names of the groups, but who are those people, since I'm not from here I'm not familiar. So thank you very much for the clarification.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Thank you.

Here's what I would like to request that we do. There was a request from Mr. Tabata to respond to some of the arguments. What I'm willing to do with the time that we have is to allow each of the parties no more than five minutes to make any final comments. You don't have to use the five minutes.

After that, this Commission will proceed to decision-making on the motion that is before us, the Motion to Dismiss. And the options we have are to grant, to deny, to schedule for further evidentiary hearing, and not necessarily exclusive of that, to

enter into some sort of stipulation that would allow the Chair to hold a settlement conference on these matters.

So are the parties ready to proceed in that manner?

MR. TABATA: Yes, thank you.

 $\label{eq:CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: I would normally start} % \end{substantial} % \end{su$

MS. CATALDO: Thank you, Chair. I wanted to address the issue of standard of review.

Commissioner Okuda raised that issue whether there

was a standard of review for this Motion to Dismiss.

Mr. Pierce went on at some length, I believe, talking I think in terms of a Motion to Dismiss or Motion for Summary Judgment standard.

At the end of that, he conceded that there was no case that set forth any standard. And so to the extent that Mr. Pierce left the Commission with the understanding that they had to indulge any doubt on the Motion to Dismiss in favor of Intervenors, I would want to stress that that is an incorrect statement of the law.

I also wanted to address very briefly the 365-day rule. Pursuant to the OSC order, this Commission made the hearing conditioned on HRS

Chapter 91 and HAR subsections 7 and 9, which includes the 365-day obligation.

The Commission and the parties understood there would be Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Commission at that time requested that they be submitted. The parties submitted proposed findings and conclusions. And so it has always been an understanding that the Commission was required to issue its findings and conclusions after Phase I.

There is no basis to argue that that requirement can be tolled. Under 15-15-74 there are only two instances that can deviate from the 365; court action, or this Commission's agreement for a very brief limited extension of 90 days, neither of which existed in this case.

Petitioners are unable to confer in any way through a request for a Motion to Stay, or this Commission's issuance of a Motion to Stay. There is no way we can relieve you of your obligation to honor the 365-day rule. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Thank you. Mr. Tabata.

MR. TABATA: Thank you.

The 365-day requirement applies from the beginning of the issuance of the OSC. Now, there's

been an argument that if there is no substantial commencement, then the procedure of 205-4 no longer applies, and therefore the 365-day requirement does not apply.

That argument is logically flawed, because if you were to negate requirements of 205-4, you would also negate your powers to conduct an Order to Show cause. It is a self-defeating dead-end argument.

In addition to the Order to Show Cause, there is the question of how many votes this Commission is going to require to pass this motion.

Is it five or six?

If it's six, then those six votes arise from 205-4(g). 205-4(g) contains the 365-day requirement. It contains the Order to Show Cause power that you possess. It also contains the two-thirds vote requirement.

I believe it's 205-4(h) that contains the six vote requirement, which is equivalent to the two/third vote requirement.

So these requirements survive even if -- and we are not admitting -- but even if you find that there is no substantial commencement, the 365-day requirement time limit will survive that process, and

does apply in either event. And that's why Hawaii

Supreme Court stated that the time for the running of
the 365 days starts upon the issuance of the Order to

Show Cause.

Real quick. Tolling of statute of
limitation, I join in my co-counsel's argument. Also
want to add that Land Use Commission does not have
equitable power to toll the statute of limitation.
There is no equitable power granted to the Land Use
Commission. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Thank you, Mr. Tabata.

Mr. Hopper, does the county have anything?

MR. HOPPER: Just briefly. We reiterate

the position that we have taken on the motion. We

think that the Commission should be aware of what is

being proposed and confirm that that is in compliance

with the Decision and Order in 1995 before

proceeding. And the county would want that

information, as a matter of record, and thinks that

is important.

So I think that's the only (indecipherable)
-- from our moving papers and our argument, but
wanted to reiterate that is still our position.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Ms. Apuna.

MS. APUNA: I think OP's position on the 365-day, what we understand it to be, is that unless the Commission finds that there is substantial commencement, then the 365 would apply; and the Commission has not yet determined substantial commencement.

So we don't think that it has -- we think it's tolled. We don't think that -- we don't think it applies yet until the Commission determines substantial commencement, then it would apply. If the Commission found there was substantial commencement, then it would have -- the OSC would have had to be completed within 365 days and reversion.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Thank you. Mr. Pierce.

MR. PIERCE: The only thing I'm going to add, not going to respond further on the 365-day rule except that everything that Mr. Tabata and Petitioners have said is absolutely inconsistent with the clear simple language in Aina Le'a.

But what I really want to point out is what the Petitioner just said with respect to the Findings of Fact. And this is in our reply memo with respect to our motion to go forward and conclude the

hearings.

And we cited specifically to the record, and to the fact that we asked for back in 2012 or 2013, we asked that a hearing be set -- this is a quote -- that a hearing be set at the earliest practicable time to render written findings with respect to Phase I.

And the Petitioners' responded as follows:

Intervenors essentially seek to compel the Commission
to enter Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as
to Phase I.

Then they go on and say, well, whether or not you do that is up to the Commission, but the Commission needs to look at this in light of the fact that there is a pending motion to stay.

In other words, the Petitioners were opposed to us entering findings of facts at that point in time. Certainly they should not now be in a position to use that as a sword against the Intervenors.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Thank you, Mr. Pierce.

Commissioners, we can now entertain motions related to the motion before us, which is the Motion to Dismiss the Order to Show Cause.

As I stated, I think we have at least four options in front of us, some of which are mutually exclusive, some of which are not.

We could grant the motion; we could deny the motion, clearly those two are exclusive.

We could schedule this motion for a further evidentiary hearing, if you so chose. You could also take some action regarding trying to empower the chairperson to hold a settlement conference on these matters.

The last thing I'll say before anybody
makes a motion is that I'm fond of this radio show
I've been listening to that's on personal finance,
and I would say about five to ten percent of the time
somebody calls in with a question that's phrased as a
financial question, and the guy ends up saying, you
don't have a money problem, you have a marriage
problem.

So to a certain degree it appears to me that, you know, all these parties in front of us are coming to us for a settlement within these sort of -- for resolution of these issues within our framework when your fundamental issues are relationship issues.

Commissioner Ohigashi.

COMMISSIONER OHIGASHI: I'm going to move

that we set an evidentiary hearing on the issue -- on 1 2 the issues presented in the Motion to Dismiss. The 3 key in my mind -- well, rather than explain why. 4 CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Why don't you -- is 5 that the full motion? 6 COMMISSIONER OHIGASHI: That's the full 7 motion at this time to set evidentiary hearing. CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: If there is a second, 8 9 then I'll allow you to speak to the motion. 10 COMMISSIONER WONG: Second. 11 CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Motion made by 12 Commissioner Ohigashi to schedule this matter for a 13 hearing, evidentiary hearing, and it was seconded by Commissioner Wong. Did I capture that correctly? 14 15 COMMISSIONER OHIGASHI: Yes. 16 CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Do you want to speak 17 to the motion? COMMISSIONER OHIGASHI: I would like to 18 19 speak to the motion because it appears there's 20 several statements regarding the three conditions that are contained in Petitioners' findings of his 2.1 22 Motion to Dismiss.

When I asked the Intervenor whether or not these actions are necessarily -- he agreed with them, or if he disagreed with them. Absent what I got --

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from the long answers that I got was that essentially they don't agree with what is being represented in 3 that area.

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And I think an evidentiary hearing focusing on what, if there -- what the proposal may be or what the violations will be; or if it has been corrected, or if they can corrected would help a lot.

We would have somebody on the record, and I'm guessing from the Petitioners' side to indicate what exactly, and how exactly their proposed development will conform with the existing D&O. the questions would be subject to cross-examination by the parties.

So I think that would go a long way to help the Commission to make a determination in this matter.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Thank you, Commissioner Ohigashi.

Does anybody else want to speak to this motion? Commissioner Okuda.

COMMISSIONER OKUDA: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'm inclined to vote in favor of the motion, and let me state the reasons why.

Cases should be decided on its merits. Ιf we took the strict, narrow application of a Motion to Dismiss, under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rules of Civil

Procedure, recognizing that the rules don't

necessarily apply in this proceeding, we would have

to assume that all the statements that the

Intervenors have made are true and correct. And that

would be basically automatically denying the Motion

to Dismiss.

So to give everyone a fair shot at presenting their complete record and facts, and so that we have it very clear on the record what everybody's position is, I believe that an evidentiary hearing is the most appropriate way of doing it.

If I can also say one thing with the understanding that my following statement is not to prejudge any of the results of this case. And I don't believe any of the other Commissioners, by giving statements that they did, intend to prejudge what they intend to do.

Because I found everybody here to be very open minded as far as how they view the evidence, but just to balance a little bit off. I recognize the benefit that the Intervenors bring to a proceeding like this. I believe that the system, even though we all frankly would like to see things worked out and

not have litigation, but sometimes it's important that issues be fleshed out by people who are willing to take their time, sometimes their money, and to sit in and present issues and evidence and things of that sort.

So I think all parties, including the Intervenors, should be commended based on their willingness to participate in important decision-making.

I firmly believe that the more admissible evidence that we have, and the more complete record that we have makes for a better decision, and frankly for a better democracy.

For those reasons and other good reasons in the record, I would be voting in favor of this motion.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Thank you,

Commissioner Okuda. Is there further discussion on
the motion?

Seeing none, Mr. Orodenker, would you please poll the Commission?

EXECUTIVE OFFICER: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The motion is to schedule an evidentiary hearing on issues presented in the Motion to Dismiss.

Commissioner Ohigashi?

1	COMMISSIONER OHIGASHI: Aye.
2	EXECUTIVE OFFICER: Commissioner Wong?
3	COMMISSIONER WONG: Aye.
4	EXECUTIVE OFFICER: Commissioner Chang?
5	COMMISSIONER CHANG: Aye.
6	EXECUTIVE OFFICER: Commissioner Okuda?
7	COMMISSIONER OKUDA: Yes.
8	EXECUTIVE OFFICER: Commissioner Cabral?
9	VICE CHAIR CABRAL: Yes.
10	EXECUTIVE OFFICER: Commissioner Aczon?
11	COMMISSIONER ACZON: Yes.
12	EXECUTIVE OFFICER: Commissioner Mahi?
13	VICE CHAIR MAHI: Aye.
14	EXECUTIVE OFFICER: Chair Scheuer?
15	CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Aye.
16	EXECUTIVE OFFICER: Thank you. Motion
17	passes unanimously.
18	CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Commissioner
19	Ohigashi.
20	COMMISSIONER OHIGASHI: I would like to
21	make another motion.
22	I would like to move to grant the authority
23	to the Chair to enter into settlement negotiations or
24	to enter into settlement conference with the parties
25	regarding the Motion to Dismiss, and in addition to

that, this motion is subject to the parties agreeing,
stipulating.

The Chair would not be foreclosed from

The Chair would not be foreclosed from participating in any hearings, or subsequent hearings, or any kind of evidentiary hearing after this by participating in this settlement conference.

And the third part of the motion is that it would give the authority of the Chair to actually set the time for the proposed evidentiary hearing in this matter.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: A motion has been made by Commissioner Ohigashi with three parts to it, and it is being --

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: It is seconded by Commissioner Cabral.

Does the movant or seconder want to speak to the motion before we open up to discussion?

COMMISSIONER OHIGASHI: No, I think it's --

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Is there any further, or is there any discussion on this motion by the Commission? Commissioner Chang.

COMMISSIONER CHANG: Thank you.

I guess I just want clarification from

Commissioner Ohigashi. I really do appreciate the opportunity if the parties are willing to come together, but that is not -- this motion is separate and apart from the motion that was just passed to conduct an evidentiary hearing. That it is dependent upon the parties agreeing to enter into settlement conference.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Mr. Ohigashi.

motion is clear. I just want to make it clear.

Settlement conference is not required by anybody to participate, that's my understanding, we're just authorizing the Chair to act as settlement conference with the understanding that if he should -- they will have to agree that he would be able to participate in any further evidentiary hearing in this matter.

If he does participate -- even if he doesn't have a settlement conference, or he's not -- the parties disagree, don't want to become part of the settlement conference, do a settlement conference, the Chair is still empowered to set the time and date of the evidentiary hearing along with staff.

COMMISSIONER CHANG: That's clear. I thought it was combining the two.

1 CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Commissioner Okuda.

COMMISSIONER OKUDA: If I may ask Mr.

3 Ohigashi one additional clarification question?

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: You may.

COMMISSIONER OKUDA: Thank you.

So in other words, Commissioner, the parties are not forced to engage in settlement discussions involving the Chair, but if they do, the Chair would act as a facilitator and this is strictly voluntary; but if they do engage and take advantage of the Chair being sort of like a facilitator in these discussions, it's with the understanding that whoever participates waives any objections that they may have to the fact that the Chair is acting as facilitator.

COMMISSIONER OHIGASHI: That's correct.

And that's why I'm asking the Land Use Commission to give the Chair the authority to do so.

COMMISSIONER OKUDA: Thank you, I understand.

And based on that, it's my inclination to vote in favor of the motion because it's simply voluntary. Nobody is being forced to do this. And if people participate, it's at least with the implied stipulation that they agree with this fact.

And I would like to also state for the record that I don't believe any Commissioner is going to take any negative, or make any negative conclusion if any one or more people decide to decline the invitation to participate.

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Because there are just some cases where people have to stand their ground and advocate their position. And if there's a decision that settlement discussions are not worthwhile, for whatever reason, I believe that the Commission respects the decisions and the rights the people have.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Thank you, Commissioner Okuda.

Commissioner Cabral.

VICE CHAIR CABRAL: I wanted to also speak.

I was willing to second that motion because, as stated by my more elegant legal lawyers on the Commission, but the hope is that perhaps some common ground could be found because I do hear some of that in the group present here, that there is some effort to perhaps things can be worked out for what I would like to continuously think of what is best for the community.

So I seconded it, and I will support the motion in the hope that things might make some

1 progress in some kind of positive manner. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Is there further

3 discussion on this?

I'll note for the record that I'm willing to do that on a voluntary basis if the parties were so inclined. Commissioner Chang.

that in whichever way this proceeds, evidentiary hearing or settlement discussion, that it timely proceeds. That we are moving -- that whatever the schedule is worked out, that 25 years has passed since the original decision was granted. We have had numerous hearings on this.

So my request is that there would be a timely schedule for this matter, that it be discussed with the parties, and that either if there's a continued hearing, a quick schedule on that, the scope of that hearing is clearly defined.

If it's a settlement discussion, that it be timely scheduled, clear parameters upon that. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: To that point I'll note that the number one song of 1995 was Gangsters Paradise. It's been awhile.

Is there any further discussion on the

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     motion? If not, Mr. Orodenker, ask you to poll the
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     Commission.
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               EXECUTIVE OFFICER: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
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      I don't remember that song.
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                The motion is to grant the authority to the
      Chair to enter into a settlement conference with the
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     parties with regard to the Motion to Dismiss, subject
     to the parties' stipulation with regard to the
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      Chair's further participation, and grant the
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     authority to the Chair to schedule the evidentiary
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     hearing.
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                Commissioner Ohigashi?
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                COMMISSIONER OHIGASHI: Aye.
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                EXECUTIVE OFFICER: Commissioner Cabral?
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                CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: He's still trying to
16
      remember the tune to Gangsters Paradise.
17
                EXECUTIVE OFFICER: Commissioner Cabral?
18
                VICE CHAIR CABRAL: Yes.
19
                EXECUTIVE OFFICER: Commissioner Mahi.
20
                VICE CHAIR MAHI: Yes.
21
                EXECUTIVE OFFICER: Commissioner Aczon?
22
                COMMISSIONER ACZON: Aye.
23
                EXECUTIVE OFFICER: Commissioner Okuda?
24
                COMMISSIONER OKUDA: Yes.
25
                EXECUTIVE OFFICER: Chair Scheuer?
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CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Aye. EXECUTIVE OFFICER: Mr. Chair, the motion passes unanimously. CHAIRPERSON SCHEUER: Because of these two motions, the next two motions are necessarily in abeyance until such time as either something comes out of the settlement, or we hold the evidentiary hearing and make a ruling on the motion before us. With that we are adjourned. (The proceedings adjourned at 12:11 p.m.)

1	CERTIFICATE
2	STATE OF HAWAII) SS.
3	COUNTY OF HONOLULU)
4	I, JEAN MARIE McMANUS, do hereby certify:
5	That on February 21, 2019, at 9:00 a.m., the
6	proceedings contained herein was taken down by me in
7	machine shorthand and was thereafter reduced to
8	typewriting under my supervision; that the foregoing
9	represents, to the best of my ability, a true and
10	correct copy of the proceedings had in the foregoing
11	matter.
12	I further certify that I am not of counsel for
13	any of the parties hereto, nor in any way interested
14	in the outcome of the cause named in this caption.
15	Dated this 21st day of February, 2019, in
16	Honolulu, Hawaii.
17	
18	
19	/s/ Jean Marie McManus
20	JEAN MARIE McMANUS, CSR #156
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22	
23	
24	
25	